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Source:  Map courtesy of U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. 
I. Introduction
The headwaters of the Klamath River draw from Upper Klamath Lake
and from a unique wetland complex in south-central Oregon and northern 
California known as the Upper Klamath Basin.1  Along its 263-mile journey 
from the Upper Basin to the Pacific Ocean, the Klamath River passes 
through the Cascade and Coast Mountain Ranges, making it one of only 
1. Office of Energy Projects, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Final
Environmental Impact Statement for Relicensing of the Klamath Hydroelectric 
Project No. 2082-027, at § 3.1 3-1 (Nov. 16, 2007), available at http://www.ferc.gov/ 
industries/hydropower/enviro/eis/2007/11-16-07.asp [hereinafter FERC FEIS]. 
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three river systems to bisect the Cascades.2  The native people of the 
Klamath Basin have fished the river for thousands of years, depending on 
historically massive migrations of chinook and coho salmon for their 
subsistence.3  Before non-native inriver salmon harvesting began in 1876,4 
the Klamath River supported the third-largest salmon runs in the United 
States, with an estimated 880,000 returning adult fish per year.5  Over the 
last century, however, major changes in hydrology, dam building, habitat 
destruction, and disease have decimated the Klamath River salmon 
population, reducing some runs to just 2 percent of their historic size and 
fueling decades of bitter conflicts.6  
In 2002, the plight of the Klamath River salmon became national news 
when an estimated 79,000 adult chinook salmon died in the lower forty 
2. UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, KLAMATH BASIN: A WATERSHED APPROACH 
TO SUPPORT HABITAT RESTORATION, SPECIES RECOVERY, AND WATER RESOURCE PLANNING 1 
(2007), available at http://wfrc.usgs.gov/pubs/factsheetpdf/kbawsafs080807.pdf; 
Klamath Riverkeeper, The Klamath River Watershed, http://www.klamathriver.org/ 
watershed.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2009).  The Klamath is unusual in that its 
headwaters are not in the mountains.  Because the Klamath River flows from the 
broad, flat Upper Klamath Basin to two rugged mountain ranges it has been 
described as a “river upside down.”  Russ Rymer, Reuniting a River, NATIONAL 
GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE, Dec., 2008, at 140; Steve Kadel, Navigating the Klamath, HERALD
AND NEWS, Feb. 18, 2008, available at http://www.heraldandnews.com/articles/ 
2008/02/22/watermarks/part%201/water5.txt.  The Pitt River (a tributary of the 
Sacramento River) and the Columbia River are the other two rivers that pass through 
the Cascade Range.  Id.  
3. SARAH A. KRUSE & ASTRID J. SCHOLZ, PRELIMINARY ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF
DAM REMOVAL: THE KLAMATH RIVER 2 (2006); INSTITUTE FOR FISHERIES RESOURCES, ESTIMATES 
OF PRE-DEVELOPMENT KLAMATH RIVER SALMON RUN SIZE 2 (1998) [hereinafter INSTITUTE FOR 
FISHERIES RESOURCES]. 
4. PETER B. MOYLE, INLAND FISHES OF CALIFORNIA 258 (2002).
5. INSTITUTE FOR FISHERIES RESOURCES, supra note 3, at 2 tbl. 2; MOYLE, supra
note 4, at 258 (estimating the historic fall run of chinook salmon at 500,000 fish). 
The Columbia River and the Sacramento-San Joaquin River system supported the 
largest and second-largest historic runs, respectively.  INSTITUTE OF FISHERIES, supra 
note 3, at 2 tbl. 2.   
6. Felicity Barringer, Pact Would Open River, Removing Four Dams, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2008; Adell Louise Amos, Hydropower Reform and the Impact of the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005 on the Klamath Basin: Renewed Optimism or Same Old Song? 22 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 1 (2007) (detailing resource conflicts in the Klamath Basin and the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission relicensing process for the Klamath Hydroelectric 
Process) [hereinafter Amos]; Glen Spain, Dams, Water Reforms, and Endangered Species in 
the Klamath Basin, 22 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 49 (2007) (cataloguing resource conflicts in 
the Klamath Basin) [hereinafter Spain].  Two recent films document resource 
conflicts in the Klamath Basin.  For a detailed portrayal of the political struggle 
between downstream Tribal fireman and upstream irrigators see, BATTLE FOR THE
KLAMATH (Veriscope Production 2005). For a moving portrayal of the Yurok, Hoopa, 
Karuk and Klamath Tribes’ battle against PacifiCorp and the Klamath Dams see, 
UPSTREAM BATTLE (Preview Production 2008).    
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miles of the river.7  The die-off was one of the worst fish kills in U.S. history.8  
For the tribal fishermen of the Lower Klamath whose ancestors lived in 
harmony with the fish for thousands of years and for whom the fish are 
sacred, the fish kill was devastating.9  For PacifiCorp, a private electric 
company whose license to operate four hydroelectric dams on the Klamath 
River would need to be renewed in two years, the national attention was bad 
timing.10 
The Federal Power Act (“FPA”) authorizes the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) to issue licenses for non-federal 
hydropower projects like PacifiCorp’s Klamath Hydroelectric Project 
(“KHP”).11  Advocates for fish passage have used two provisions of the FPA to 
ensure that environmental costs are factored into the total cost of a dam:12  
1) section 4(e) of the FPA requires that FERC accept license conditions
imposed by federal land management agencies,13 and 2) section 18 of the
FPA requires FERC to include in the license any conditions proscribed by
other agencies, such as fishways.14  Applications of sections 4(e) and 18 can
result in driving the cost of a hydroelectric project beyond the point of
7. The California Department of Fish and Game (“CDFG”) originally
estimated the number to be 34,000 dead adult fish. CDFG later explained that their 
original estimate was “very conservative” and underestimated the number of adult 
fish by 45,000.  CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME, SEPTEMBER 2002 KLAMATH 
RIVER FISH-KILL: FINAL ANALYSIS OF CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND IMPACTS 158 (2004). 
Unfortunately, news reports relied on the earlier inaccurate figure.  See Timothy Egan, 
As Thousands of Salmon Die, Fight for River Erupts Again, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2002 
(estimating the number to be between 10,000 and 30,000 adult fish); Rymer, supra 
note 2, at 140 (estimating the number to be at least 30,000 adult fish).  Later reports 
relied on the revised figure.  See BATTLE FOR THE KLAMATH, supra note 6 (estimating the 
number to be 70,000 adult fish). The 2002 fish kill was not the Klamath Basin’s first. 
See Carl Ullman, Adjudicating Water Rights While Addressing Broad Resource Issues: Fitting a 
Round Peg into a Square Hole, American Bar Association, 28th Annual Water Law 
Conference, at 1 (Manuscript 2010 on file with author). Smaller fish kills in Upper 
Klamath Lake in 1995, 1996, and 1997 rescieved less attention because they did not 
involve salmon. Id. 
8. See Rymer, supra note 2, at 140.
9. See id.
10. Id.  PacifiCorp, Company Facts, http://www.pacificorp.com/Navigation/
Navigation3877.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Company Facts]. 
11. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–825 (2006).
12. See David H. Becker, The Challenges of Dam Removal: The History and Lessons of
the Condit Dam and the Potential Threats from the 2005 Federal Power Act Amendments, 36 ENVT. 
L. 811, 814 (2006) [hereinafter Becker].
13. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e).
14. Id. at § 811.
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profitability.15  To receive a FERC license, a private dam operator must also 
comply with the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).  Section 401 of the CWA requires 
an applicant for any federal license for activity that could result in a 
discharge to navigable waters to obtain certification of compliance with 
state water quality standards from the state or states involved.16  The 
certification process can serve as a functional state veto over a potential 
FERC license for a project that cannot comply with state water quality 
standards because FERC cannot issue a license without the state 
certification.17 
PacifiCorp’s license for the KHP includes four hydroelectric dams on 
the mainstem of the Klamath River: Iron Gate, Copco 1, Copco 2, and J.C. 
Boyle.18  None of the four dams provide adequate fish passage, and they 
therefore block an estimated 570 stream-miles of historically productive 
salmon habitat.19  With its license for the KHP set to expire on March 1, 
2006,20 less than two years after the fish kill, PacifiCorp applied to FERC for a 
renewal of its license on February 26, 2004.21  Acting under section 18 of the 
FPA, the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) and the Fish and 
Wildlife Service (“FWS”) prescribed fish screens and fishways for all four 
dams, to be financed by PacifiCorp.22  Even if PacifiCorp agreed to construct 
volitional fish passage at an estimated cost of over $46 million each year for 
the life of any new license,23 the states of Oregon and California were in a 
position to deny water quality certification, blocking license renewal 
15. See Becker, supra note 12, at 814; see also Michael C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol,
The Decline of the Hydropower Czar and the Rise of Agency Pluralism in Hydroelectric Licensing, 26 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 81, 130 (2001). 
16. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
17. See Kevin Beaton et al., The 1998 Idaho Water Quality Symposium, 35 IDAHO L.
REV. 453, 545 (1999); see also Becker, supra note 12, at 822; Spain, supra note 6, at 110. 
The CWA provides that “[n]o license or permit shall be granted until the certification 
required by this section has been obtained or has been waived as provided in the 
preceding sentence.  No license or permit shall be granted if certification has been 
denied by the State, interstate agency, or the Administrator, as the case may be.”  33 
U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). 
18. FERC FEIS, supra note 1, at xxxiii.
19. Spain, supra note 6, at 102–3.  The figure of 570 stream-miles of habitat
includes the mainstem of the Klamath River and its tributaries above the Iron Gate 
Dam.  Id.  
20. FERC FEIS, supra note 1, at xxxiii.  PacifiCorp’s fifty-year license was
issued in 1956 and expired in 2006.  The company is currently operating the Klamath 
Hydroelectric Project under an annual license.  Id.   
21. Id.
22. FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 2.3.1.3, 2-27.
23. FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 4.4, 4-4.  This cost, FERC noted, exceeds the
value of the power likely to be generated by the dams during that time frame. 
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altogether.24  
On November 13, 2008, after four years of hearings, appeals, and 
studies, the federal government, the states, and PacifiCorp signed an 
“Agreement in Principle”25 (“AIP”) addressing a framework for removal of the 
four major dams on the Klamath River, and promising to develop a final 
agreement shortly.26  On September 30, 2009, PacifiCorp and twenty-nine 
federal, state, tribal, county, environmental, irrigation, and fishing 
organizations announced the Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement 
(“KHSA”) outlining a plan for dam removal by 2020.27  If the parties follow 
through with the KHSA framework, the result would be the largest dam 
removal in history.28  On February 18, 2010, representatives from more than 
fifty organizations signed both the KHSA and the Klamath Basin Restoration 
Agreement (“KBRA”), a separate agreement on river restoration and water 
allocation.29  Together, the KHSA and KBRA offer an unprecedented plan for 
comprehensive river restoration.30  However, combining federal legislation 
needed for the two very different agreements may threaten the goal of dam 
removal by 2020.31  Additionally, preconditions on a final determination on 
dam removal,32 along with uncertainties about funding,33 liability,34 and 
potential litigation35 could also each frustrate achieving dam removal by 
24. See infra Part III.C.5.
25. AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE (2008), http://www.doi.gov/news/08_News_
Releases/klamathaip.pdf [hereinafter AIP]. 
26. News Release, U.S. Department of the Interior, Agreement in Principle
Marks First Critical Step on Presumptive Path to Remove Four Klamath River Dams 
(Nov. 13, 2008), available at https://www.doi.gov/news/08_News_Releases/111308.html 
[hereinafter DOI News Release].  
27. KLAMATH HYDROELECTRIC SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (Feb. 18, 2010) [hereinafter
KHSA]. 
28. DOI News Release, supra note 26; see also Felicity Barringer, Deal on Dams on
Klamath Advances, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2008 (quoting Steve Thompson, Regional 
Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service as stating that removing the four dams would 
be “one of the most amazing restoration projects in the world”). 
29. KLAMATH BASIN RESTORATION AGREEMENT FOR THE SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC AND
TRUST RESOURCES AND AFFECTED COMMUNITIES (Feb. 18, 2010) [hereinafter KBRA]. 
PacifiCorp was not required to and did not sign the KBRA.  See KHSA, supra note 27, § 
2.2. 
30. See Barringer, supra note 28.
31. See infra Part V.A.
32. See infra Part V.B, D.
33. See infra Part V.C.
34. See infra Part V.E.
35. See infra Part V.G; see Janine Robben, Navigating Water Law in Oregon, 69 Or.
St. B. Bull. 17, 20.  “Some of the organizations that have been concerned about 
Klamath Basin water for years, most notably some environmental groups, did not 
sign off on it, which may result in collateral attacks.”  Id. 
 West  Northwest, Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 2010 
433 
2020. 
This article examines the background, content, and viability of the 
KHSA.  Section II provides the legal context of the KHSA, explaining FERC 
relicensing, sections 4(e) and 18 of the FPA, and 401 of the CWA.  Section III 
describes the KHP and PacifiCorp’s initial attempt to relicense the project. 
Section IV analyzes each element of the KHSA, highlighting threats to the 
goal of dam removal by 2020 and evaluating the public policy of the 
agreement.  Section V concludes that, despite the agreement’s flaws, unified 
support for the KHSA represents the best hope for Klamath River salmon. 
II. Agency Pluralism and Recognizing the Total Cost of a
Dam
In 1920, Congress passed the Federal Water Power Act (“FWPA”) to 
streamline the federal process for regulating private hydroelectric projects.36  
The FWPA established the Federal Power Commission (“FPC”) to license the 
construction and operation of private hydroelectric projects.37  At the time, 
Congress was not concerned about the environmental consequences of dam 
construction, and the FWPA did not contain adequate protection for fish and 
wildlife.38  For nearly sixty years, FPC licensed new dams with little to no 
consideration of the facilities’ effects on the environment.39  
Today, FERC is the federal agency responsible for licensing private 
hydroelectric projects, and the FPA governs the FERC licensing process.40  
The FPA grants FERC exclusive jurisdiction to issue licenses for hydroelectric 
projects, but authorizes state and federal agencies to recommend license 
conditions designed to protect natural resources.41  The courts have found 
some of these conditioning authorities to be mandatory, thereby requiring 
36. The Federal Water Power Act is now named the Federal Power Act and is
codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–825 (2006).  Max J. Mizejewski, FERC’s Abdication of 
Jurisdiction over Hydroelectric Dams on Nonnavigable Rivers: A Potential Setback for 
Comprehensive Stream Management, 27 ENVTL. L. 741, 746 (1997); see Escondido Mutual Water 
Company v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 773 (1984).  “In 1920, Congress 
passed the Federal Water Power Act in order to eliminate the inefficiency and 
confusion caused by the ‘piecemeal, restrictive, negative approach’ to licensing 
prevailing under prior law.”  Id. (quoting First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 
U.S. 152, 180 (1946)). 
37. See Blumm & Nadol, supra, note 15, at 86; 41 Stat. 1063, 1063 (current
version at 16 U.S.C. § 792 (2006)). 
38. See Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 86–87.
39. See Becker, supra note 12, at 821; Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 86–87.
40. See Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 86–87 (discussing how
congressional amendments to the FWPA changed the name of FPC to FERC, and how 
the FPA supplemented the FWPA in 1935).  
41. 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 803(a)(1), 803(j), 811 (2005); see Amos, supra note 6, at
5 (explaining agency recommendations in the FERC licensing process). 
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FERC to include the conditions in its licenses.42  In several recent FERC 
relicensing processes, these provisions have led to agreements on dam 
removal.43  During relicensing of the KHP, federal agency prescriptions and 
the potential denial of state water quality certification drove the parties to 
plan for dam removal.44  
A. Federal Agency Conditions and Prescriptions
Beginning with the Supreme Court’s decision in Escondido Mutual Water 
Company v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians,45 courts have interpreted sections 
4(e) and 18 of the FPA to grant federal agencies mandatory conditioning 
authority for a FERC license.46  Courts have also determined that section 10 
of the FPA grants federal agencies non-mandatory conditioning authority to 
provide FERC with non-binding recommendations.47  Part 1 of this section 
explains the decisions interpreting sections 4(e), 18, and 10 of the FPA.  Part 
2 explains the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPA”),48 which changed the 
procedures a federal agency must follow to impose a condition on a FERC 
license.49  
1. Sections 4(e), 18, and 10 of the Federal Power Act
Section 4(e) of the FPA requires that a FERC license “shall be subject 
to and contain such conditions as the Secretary of the department under 
whose supervision such reservation falls shall deem necessary for the 
42. See infra Part II.A–B (discussing sections 4(e) and 18 of the FPA and
section 401 of the CWA and related case law). 
43. See Becker, supra note 12, at 814.  “The FPA’s provisions that require FERC
to give equal consideration to fish and wildlife protection in its licensing decisions, 
and to accept as mandatory other resource agencies’ license conditions, led directly 
to the successful removal of the Edwards Dam and the agreement to remove the 
Condit Dam.”  Id.  When decommissioning appears necessary, FERC favors 
negotiated settlements.  Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Policy Statement on 
Hydropower Licensing Settlements 1, 116 FERC ¶ 61,270 (Sept. 21, 2006).  But 
ultimately, FERC asserts that it has authority to reject an application for relicense 
and to unilaterally order the decommissioning of a project.  Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, Policy Statement, Project Decommissioning at Relicensing 2–5, 69 FERC ¶ 
61,336 (Dec. 14, 1994).  FERC has acted under this authority only once, unilaterally 
ordering the decommissioning of the Edwards Dam, but because this case resulted 
in a negotiated settlement, the policy has never been subject to challenge in court.   
44. See infra Part III.
45. 466 U.S. 765 (1984).
46. See infra Part II.A.1.
47. Id.
48. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 241, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
49. See infra Part II.A.2.
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adequate protection and utilization of such reservation.”50  The term 
“reservations” includes national forests managed by the Secretary of 
Agriculture and various lands managed by the Secretary of the Interior.51  
FERC’s authority to reject 4(e) conditions was at issue in Escondido Mutual 
Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians.52  Escondido involved an application 
for a FERC relicense of a diversion dam on the San Luis Rey River in 
California.53  Under section 4(e), the Secretary of the Interior prescribed 
twelve conditions on the license to ensure water for the Indian Reservations, 
protect water quality, and restore fish habitat.54  FERC rejected the 
Secretary’s conditions and refused to include them in the license, and the 
Department of the Interior, the La Jolla Band, and the licensee all sued.55  In 
the first major blow to FERC’s exclusive authority to condition licenses, the 
Supreme Court held that the plain language of section 4(e) required FERC to 
accept the conditions.56  Escondido changed the institutional relationship 
between the Department of Interior and FERC and established a significant 
precedent that would be applied to other hydropower license conditioning 
authorities over the next two decades.57  
Section 18 of the FPA provides that FERC “shall require the 
construction, maintenance, and operation by a licensee at its own 
expense . . . such fishways as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the 
Interior or the Secretary of Commerce. . .”58  In American Rivers v. FERC 
50. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e).
51. “The term ‘reservations,’ as used in the FPA, includes certain lands and
facilities under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Forest Service within Agriculture, and 
various components of Interior (namely, FWS, the National Park Service, the Bureau 
of Land Management, the Bureau of Reclamation, or the Bureau of Indian Affairs).” 
Resource Agency Procedures for Conditions and Prescriptions in Hydropower 
Licenses, 70 Fed. Reg. 69,804, 69,806 (Nov. 17, 2005). 
52. 466 U.S. 765 (1984). For a complete discussion of Escondido, see Blumm &
Nadol, supra note 15, at 90–96. 
53. 466 U.S. at 768.  The dam was located on the La Jolla Indian Reservation
and diverted water into a canal that ran through the La Jolla, Rincon, and San 
Pasqual Indian Reservations. Id.  
54. See generally Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. FERC, 692 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1982),
rev’d in part & aff’d in part sub nom., Escondito Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of 
Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765 (1984).  
55. Id. at 1229.
56. Escondido, 466 U.S. at 772; see Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 95
(describing FERC’s pre-Escondido licensing authority as “almost unlimited”). 
57. See Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 96 (discussing the importance of
Escondido to the later rulings in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of 
Ecology 511 U.S. 700 (1994) and American Rivers v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
Both cases and their importance to KHSA negotiations are discussed infra Parts 
II.A.2, II.B.2.
58. 16 U.S.C. § 811. The term “fishway” has itself been subject to some
controversy. After FERC promulgated narrow definitions for the term in 1991 and 
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(American Rivers II),59 federal agencies made multiple prescriptions under 
section 18 for the relicensing of the Leaburg-Walterville Hydroelectric 
Project on the McKenzie River in Oregon.60  In response, FERC adopted the 
conditions which involved fish ladders and fish screens, but determined that 
many of the other section 18 conditions did not constitute “fishway 
prescriptions,” and therefore did not include them in the license.61  Citing 
Escondido, the Ninth Circuit62 held that FERC “may not modify, reject, or 
reclassify any prescriptions submitted by the Secretaries under color of 
section 18.”63  American Rivers II was a significant precedent for the KHP 
relicensing because it required FERC to include in any new license the 
section 18 prescriptions developed by the NMFS and FWS.64 
American Rivers II also addressed federal agency conditioning authority 
under sections 10 (j) and 10(a) of the FPA.  Section 10(j) requires FERC to 
include conditions in all hydropower licenses that “adequately and equitably 
protect, mitigate damages to, and enhance, fish and wildlife (including 
related spawning grounds and habitat)” and that these conditions be based 
on recommendations by the NMFS and FWS.65  To reject agency 
recommendations under section 10(j), FERC must make findings that the 
agencies’ recommended conditions are not consistent with the FPA, and 
that FERC’s conditions will protect fish and wildlife.66  Section 10(a)(2)(B) 
states that FERC “shall consider” state and federal agency recommendations 
then again in 1992, Congress vacated FERC’s definitions and provided that any future 
FERC definition of the term would require concurrence by the Secretary of the 
Interior and the Secretary of Commerce. Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1701(b), 106 Stat. 
3008. Congress clarified that fishways shall provide for “the safe and timely upstream 
and downstream passage of fish [and] shall be limited to physical structures, 
facilities, or devices necessary to maintain all life stages of such fish, and project 
operations and measures related to such structures, facilities, or devices which are 
necessary to ensure the effectiveness of such structures, facilities, or devices for such 
fish.”  Id.; see Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 109 (discussing the evolution of the 
term “fishway”).   
59. American Rivers v. FERC, 201 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2000).  To distinguish this
case from an earlier opinion in American Rivers v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(discussed infra Part II.B.3), the Ninth Circuit opinion will be referred to as American 
Rivers II, and the Second Circuit case will be referred to as American Rivers I.  See 
Blumm and Nadol, supra note 15, at 75n.17 and accompanying text. 
60. American Rivers, 201 F.3d at 1192.
61. Id.
62. Under the judicial review provisions of the FPA, challenges to FERC
rulings are not reviewed by the district court; rather they are brought in the circuit 
court.  
63. 201 F.3d at 1210.
64. These prescriptions are discussed infra Part III.C.1. For a discussion of the
significance of American Rivers II see Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 108–17. 
65. 16 U.S.C. § 803(j)(1).
66. Id. § 803(j)(2)(A)–(b); see Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 110–11.
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for fish and wildlife, but does not require FERC to make findings to reject 
the recommendations.67  In American Rivers II, state and federal agencies 
submitted fifty-six recommendations for the Leaburg-Walterville license 
under section 10(j).68  FERC reclassified twenty-one of the section 10(j) 
recommendations as section 10(a) recommendations, did not include the 
twenty-one recommendations in the license, and did not make findings 
justifying the rejections.69  The Ninth Circuit distinguished 
recommendations under section 10(j) from mandatory conditions under 
section 4(e).70  The court determined that Congress granted FERC some 
discretion in how to implement section 10(j), and that it could, after giving 
them “due regard,” lawfully reject the recommendations.71 
2. The 2005 Federal Power Act Amendments
The hydropower industry opposed the mandatory conditioning 
authority affirmed in Escondido and American Rivers II because the 
interpretations enabled agencies to require expensive conditions and 
prescriptions based on agency science.72  Beginning in the mid-1980s, the 
industry lobbied Congress to amend the FPA to make it more difficult for 
federal agencies to impose mandatory conditions and prescriptions on 
FERC licenses under sections 4(e) and 18.73  The industry’s efforts appeared 
to pay off when Congress passed, and President George W. Bush signed, the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005.74  In the EPA, Congress imposed cumbersome new 
procedures controlling federal agency conditioning authority.75 
Under the EPA, if a federal agency imposes a section 4(e) condition or 
a section 18 prescription on a license, the applicant, or any party to the 
licensing proceeding, may respond by proposing an alternative condition or 
prescription.76  The federal agency that imposed the condition must then 
accept the alternative condition if it will result in cost savings “while still 
“provid[ing] for the adequate protection and utilization of the reservation” 
(for section 4(e) conditions), or is “no less protective than the fishway 
67. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(2)(B).
68. American Rivers, 201 F.3d at 1192.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1202.
71. Id.
72. See Spain, supra note 6, at 106; see Becker, supra note 12, at 850; see Amos,
supra note 6, at 10. 
73. See Becker, supra note 12, at 850–52, n.258 and accompanying text, n.259
and accompanying text (describing the industry’s lobbying efforts, two failed bills, 
and the various versions of the 2005 Energy Policy Act).   
74. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 241, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
75. See Becker, supra note 12, at 850–52.
76. Energy Policy Act of 2005, U.S.C. § 241(c).
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initially prescribed” (for section 18 prescriptions).77  If the federal agency 
determines the alternative conditions will not adequately protect the 
resource or will be less protective and the agency continues to support its 
original conditions, FERC can direct the conflict to its Dispute Resolution 
Service (“DSR”).78  The DSR will then issue a “non-binding advisory” which 
the federal agency “may accept” unless it determines the recommendation 
will not “adequately protect” the resource.79  Under both the alternative 
conditioning provision and the DSR provision of the EPA, it is the federal 
agency that proposed the original condition - not FERC - that determines 
whether an alternative condition would provide adequate protection. 
Therefore, the alternative conditioning and DSR provisions of the EPA did 
not overturn the mandatory agency conditioning authority affirmed in 
Escondido and American Rivers II, although the EPA did add more steps to the 
process of prescribing mandatory conditions.  
In addition to the two processes described above, the EPA also allows 
for “an agency trial-type hearing” to be conducted by a FERC Administrative 
Law Judge.80  The trial-type hearing may be requested by the license 
applicant or any party to the licensing proceeding that disputes an issue of 
material fact related to the section 4(e) conditions or section 18 
prescriptions.81  The hearings must provide for discovery and allow industry 
the opportunity to cross-examine agency scientists.82  Immediately following 
the passage of the EPA, the Departments of Interior, Agriculture, and 
Commerce promulgated interim final rules83 that extended the right to 
propose alternative conditions and to request a trial-type hearing to parties 
in all future licensing proceedings, as well as to parties in pending 
proceedings.84  
A coalition of conservation groups brought a facial challenge to the 
interim final rules in 2006,85 alleging two violations of the Administrative 
77. Id.  See Becker, supra note 12, at 851.
78. Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 241(c).  FERC may refer the dispute if it
determines the condition “would be inconsistent with the purposes of this part, or 
other applicable law.”  Id.    
79. Id.
80. Id. at § 241(a), (b).
81. Id.
82. Resource Agency Procedures for Conditions and Prescriptions in
Hydropower Licenses, 70 Fed. Reg. 69,804, 69,807 (Nov. 17, 2005). See Becker, supra 
note 12, at 855.  
83. 70 Fed. Reg. 69,804 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 1 (Dep’t of Agriculture),
43 C.F.R. pt. 45 (Dep’t of the Interior), and 50 C.F.R. pt. 221 (Dep’t of Commerce)). 
84. Id. at 69,807.
85. Am. Rivers v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. C05-2086P, 2006 WL 2841929 (D.
Wash. 2006); see Amos, supra note 6, at 20–23 (discussing the case).  The plaintiffs 
included American Rivers, Friends of the River, Idaho Rivers United, American 
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Procedure Act (“APA”).86  The plaintiffs alleged that the three agencies failed 
to provide notice and comment in violation of sections 553(b) and (c) of the 
APA, and that the interim final rules had an impermissible retroactive effect 
because the rules extended new rights to parties in pending proceedings.87  
On the first claim, the reviewing court determined that the rules were 
exempt from the APA’s notice and comment requirements because the rules 
were procedural and interpretative, not substantive.88  On the second claim, 
the court determined that applying the EPA to pending license proceedings 
was not impermissibly retroactive’’’.89  The court’s holding made the new 
procedural rights of the EPA applicable to pending FERC license 
proceedings, including the KHP relicensing proceeding.  As discussed below, 
the KHP became the first full proceedings under the EPA.90  
B. Section 401 of the Clean Water Act and the State’s Role
In Hydropower Licensing
The CWA requires states to set “comprehensive water quality 
Whitewater, Trout Unlimited, and Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund, Inc.  Trial 
Pleading at 1, Am. Rivers, 2006 WL 1176934. 
86. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706, 1305, 3105,
3344, 4301, 5335, 5362, 7521 (2006). 
87. Am. Rivers, No. C05-2086P, at 1.
88. Id. at 8.  Plaintiffs conceded that some of the interim final rules were
procedural or interpretive, but argued that five of the rules were substantive and 
therefore were subject to the APA’s notice and comment requirements.  Id. at 4.  One 
of the five rules that plaintiffs argued was substantive was the “the applicability 
provision.”  Id. at 5.  The applicability provision states that “the rules are effective 
immediately and apply to pending proceedings in which a final license has not been 
issued.”  Id.  Plaintiffs argued that the EPA did not clearly provide that the new rights 
be made available to pending license proceedings.  See id.  The court sided with the 
defendants, determining that because Congress made the EPA “effective 
immediately” and because the EPA would be “applicable to all license applicants” 
that the applicability provision of the interim final rules was interpretative.  Id.     
89. Am. Rivers, No. C05-2086P, at 15.  The court applied the two-part test
established in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).  The Landgraf test first 
asks “whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach.”  Id. at 
280. If the answer to this question is “yes,” retroactive application of the statute is
permissible.  Id.  When Congress has not expressly prescribed the reach of the
statute, the court must determine “whether it would impair rights a party possessed
when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties
with respect to transactions already completed.”  Id.  Under the first part of the
Landgraf test, the court determined that Congress did not expressly provide whether
the rights of the EPA would apply to pending license proceedings.  Id. at 9.  Under
step two of the Landgraf test, the court concluded that the EPA did not have an
impermissible retroactive effect on finalized conditions and prescriptions, new rights,
intervention decisions, settlements, or the ability to comment.  Id. at 9–14.
90. See Amos, supra note 6, at 26–29. The KHP relicensing process is discussed
infra Part III.C.  
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standards” for interstate waters.91  States create water quality standards by 
designating uses for specific water bodies and establishing water quality 
criteria to protect those uses.92  The CWA requires states to enforce their 
water quality standards, and one tool for doing so is provided in section 401 
of the CWA.93  Section 401 requires that a state must first issue a water 
quality certification before the federal government may approve an activity 
that could result in a discharge to intrastate navigable waters.94  In its water 
quality certification, the state must include any conditions on the license 
needed to ensure that the project will meet effluent limitations, applicable 
state laws, and “other limitations” needed to comply with water quality 
standards.95  If a state believes that a project will not meet effluent 
limitations, state laws, or other limitations even with license conditions, the 
state must deny certification, and the project cannot go forward.96 
In S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection,97 the Supreme 
Court addressed the question of whether discharges from dams trigger the 
need for state water quality certification.98  Warren, a paper company, sought 
the renewal of its FERC license to operate five dams on the Presumpscot 
River in Maine.99  The state of Maine issued a 401 certification for the license 
on the condition that Warren would operate the dams to provide for a 
minimum stream flow in the river below the dam and to allow passage for 
migratory fish and eels.100  FERC included Maine’s conditions in its license, 
and Warren sued, claiming the operation of its dams would not result in 
“discharges” under the CWA, and therefore relicensing did not trigger the 
need for state water quality certification.101  Writing for a unanimous Court, 
Justice Scalia explained that the term “discharge” as used in section 401 was 
broader than the phrase “discharge of a pollutant” used elsewhere in the 
CWA.102  In lieu of a statutory definition of the term, Justice Scalia held that 
the plain meaning of “discharge” included the water leaving a dam.103  The 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of “discharge” in Warren is significant 
91. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 700
(1994) (citing § 303 of the CWA). 
92. Id. at 707 (citing § 309 of the CWA).
93. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1977).
94. Id.
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
96. See id.
97. 547 U.S. 370 (2006).
98. Id. at 387.
99. Id. at 373.
100. Id. at 375.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 387.
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because it ensures that states have authority to protect water quality during 
any FERC hydroelectric licensing that includes discharges from a dam.104   
Once the requirement for state water quality certification is triggered, 
states must ensure that “the activity” to be licensed will not violate water 
quality standards.105  In PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of 
Ecology,106 the Supreme Court addressed a state’s authority to condition 
aspects of a project beyond the discharge.107  PUD No. 1 involved a proposal 
by the city of Tacoma and a utility district to build a hydroelectric project on 
the Dosewallips River in Washington.108  Fearing the project would not leave 
enough water in the river to support salmon and trout populations 
(designated uses of the Dosewallips)109 the state of Washington included in 
its water quality certification the condition that flows in the bypass reach be 
about 30 percent greater than originally proposed.110  The Supreme Court 
upheld the minimum stream flow requirements, explaining that the term 
“water quality standards” as used in section 401 could include designated 
uses or the criteria to protect those uses.111  The ruling is significant because 
it broadened the scope of a state’s conditioning authority over FERC 
hydropower licenses to protect either designated uses or numeric water 
quality criteria, as well as to impose minimum stream flows on a FERC 
license.112 
One question remaining after the Supreme Court’s holding in PUD No. 
1 was whether FERC retained ultimate authority to reject a state’s 401 
conditions and issue a hydropower license without them.113  The Second 
104. See id.
105. 40 C.F.R. 121.2(1)(3) (2008).
106. 51 U.S. 700 (1994).
107. Id. at 709.
108. Id.  The project called for diverting about 75 percent of the water into a
tunnel that would run alongside the river through a series of turbines.  Only 25 
percent of Dosewallips’ water would be released into the bypass reach.  Id.  
109. Id. at 714.
110. Id. at 709.
111. Id. at 714.  The court rejected the city’s argument that the state could only
condition aspects of the project that would threaten both a designated use and water 
quality criteria.  Id. at 714–15.  33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (2000).  The court went on to 
hold that the antidegradation policy of the CWA was also sufficient justification for 
conditioning the minimum stream flows.  PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 718–719.  The 
antidegradation policy of the CWA is designed to “fill the gaps” that may exist under 
the traditional water quality standards by establishing a three tiered classification for 
water bodies.  See Craig N. Johnston, et al., Legal Protection of the Environment 191 
n.7 (2007).
112. See Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 99; see Christopher Rycewicz & Dan
Mensher, Growing State Authority under the Clean Water Act, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 57, 
57 (2007). 
113. See Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 100.
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Circuit addressed this question in American Rivers, Inc. v. FERC (American Rivers 
I).114  In American Rivers I, three companies sought licenses for several 
hydroelectric projects in the state of Vermont.115  Vermont granted 
certification under eighteen conditions,116 but FERC, reversing a 
longstanding policy to leave review of 401 conditions to state courts,117 
unilaterally found three of the eighteen conditions to be beyond the scope 
of the state’s authority under section 401 and issued the Tunbridge Mill 
Corporation a license without the three conditions.118 
The Second Circuit reviewed the CWA issues de novo, explaining that 
FERC’s interpretation of section 401 was not entitled to deference because 
the Environmental Protection Agency, not FERC, administered the CWA.119  
The court then held that the plain meaning of section 401(d) was 
“unequivocal” and provided “little room for FERC to argue” that it had 
authority to reject a state’s conditions.120  The court cited Escondido,121 finding 
the case a “strikingly analogous factual and legal scenario.”122  Escondido, the 
court explained, determined that FERC lacked authority to reject conditions 
offered by another governmental agency in the face of clear statutory 
114. 129 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997).
115. Id. at 102.  The court focused its review on the license granted to the
Tunbridge Mill Corporation (“Tunbridge”) for a small hydroelectric facility on the First 
Fork of the White River.  Tunbridge had properly applied to Vermont’s Agency of 
Natural Resources (“VANR”) for 401 certification and, after several discussions, 
Tunbridge and VANR agreed on conditions to be included in the certification. Id.  
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Id.  The state of Vermont objected, but FERC denied rehearing, prompting
Vermont to appeal to the Second Circuit.  Id. at 103. 
119. Id. at 107 (citing Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837 (1984), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (1972) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided 
in this chapter, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency . . . shall 
administer this chapter.”), West v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 1122 (1989) (agencies interpreting a 
statute administered by another agency are not entitled to deference), Oregon Natural 
Desert Assoc. v. Thomas, 940 F.Supp. 1534, (D.Or. 1996) (U.S. Forest Service is not 
entitled to deference  interpreting  section  401 because EPA alone administers the 
CWA).  
120. American Rivers, 129 F.3d at 107 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) as providing
that “any certification provided under this section…shall become a condition of any 
Federal license or permit subject to the provisions of this section.”).  The court 
narrowly interpreted the holding in Keating v. FERC, 97 F.2d 616 (D.C.Cir. 1991), a case 
that affirmed FERC’s authority to review state 401 conditions.  Keating involved the 
licensing of a dam in California.  The Second Circuit held that Keating simply involved 
FERC’s authority to ensure that it had obtained a valid certificate from the state, and 
that this inquiry extended only to whether or not the state had followed the proper 
procedure required for issuing certification.  129 F.3d at 109. 
121. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing Escondido).
122. American Rivers, 129 F.3d at 109–11.
 West  Northwest, Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 2010 
443 
language requiring the conditions be adopted.123  American Rivers I is 
significant because it affirmed that the state’s role in shaping the outcome 
of FERC licensing proceedings is mandatory and on par with federal agency 
conditioning authorities under the FPA.124  Taken together, the decisions in 
Warren, PUD No. 1, and American Rivers I solidify a broad authority for states to 
protect water quality during FERC hydropower licensing by imposing 
mandatory license conditions or by denying project certification.  
III. Efficient Breach: Attempting to Relicense the Klamath
Hydroelectric Project
PacifiCorp is a private utility company that provides electricity to 1.7 
million customers in Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, and 
California.125  From 2005 to 2008, PacifiCorp netted an average yearly profit 
of $377 million.126  The Klamath Hydroelectric Project (“KHP”) makes up only 
a small fraction of PacifiCorp’s energy portfolio, accounting for less than 2 
percent of the company’s total generating capacity.127  This Part describes 
the KHP, explains the environmental problems caused by the Klamath 
dams, and analyzes how PacifiCorp’s attempt to relicense the KHP led to the 
Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement.  
A. The Effect of the Klamath Hydroelectric Project on Fish
and Water Quality
PacifiCorp’s license for the KHP includes eight dams and power 
generating structures located in Oregon and California.128  The eight dams 
and structures are: 1) East Side, 2) West Side, 3) Keno, 4) J.C. Boyle, 5) 
Copco No. 1, 6) Copco No. 2, 7) Fall Creek, and 8) Iron Gate.129  The upstream 
boundary of the KHP is marked by Link River Dam, which is owned by the 
Bureau of Reclamation (“BOR”) and regulates the water level of Upper 
Klamath Lake at the input canal for BOR’s Klamath Irrigation Project, 
123. Id.
124. See Blumm & Nadol, supra note 15, at 106 (explaining the significance of
American Rivers I).  
125. Company Facts, supra note 10.
126. United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 10-K,
PacifiCorp, at 41 (2008), available at http://www.pacificorp.com/File/File88145.pdf. 
127. FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 1.2. “Capacity,” often measured in megawatts
(“MW”), is a term used to describe the amount of electricity that can be produced by 
a generator under certain conditions. PacifiCorp’s total capacity refers to the amount 
of electricity that can be generated by all of the company’s power plants. See 
Company Facts, supra note 10.   
128. FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 2.1.1.  For a map of the Klamath Basin see infra
table 1. 
129. Id.
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located near the town of Klamath Falls, Oregon.130  PacifiCorp diverts water 
from Link River Dam to two power generating structures: the East Side and 
West Side developments, both located off the mainstem of the Klamath 
River.131  Below Link River Dam on the mainstem of the Klamath River is 
Keno Dam132 and the four major hydroelectric dams: J.C. Boyle, Copco No. 1, 
Copco No. 2, and Iron Gate.133  In total, the KHP has an installed capacity of 
169 MW.134  The actual output of the KHP, however, has averaged only about 
half that - 81.94 MW - over the last fifty-year FERC license.135  For 
130. Id. at § 2.1.1.1. Because PacifiCorp does not own the federal Link River
Dam, it is not part of the KHP. However, until 2006, PacifiCorp operated Link River 
Dam under a separate agreement with BOR, which allowed PacifiCorp some control 
over releases from the dam in exchange for selling discounted power to BOR’s 
Klamath Irrigation Project irrigators. Id. BOR finished construction on a new fish 
ladder on Link River Dam in 2005 that should enable passage of suckers and 
salmonids into Upper Klamath Lake from Link River. Id. The agreement between BOR 
and PacifiCorp expired in 2006. Currently PacifiCorp operates Link River Dam under 
an annual contract renewable at the parties’ discretion. Id.  “In recent years, however, 
PacifiCorp claims this operational flexibility has not been fully realized, as BOR has 
specified releases from Link River dam in an attempt to comply with Biological 
Opinions (BiOps) relating to two species of sucker in Upper Klamath Lake and coho 
salmon in the lower Klamath River, all of which are listed as either endangered or 
threatened under the Endangered Species Act.”  Id. For a discussion of the impacts of 
providing a “select group” of Klamath Irrigation Project irrigators with highly 
subsidized power, see Spain, supra note 6, at 113–17. 
131. FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 2.1.1.1. The authorized generating capacity for
the East Side and West Side powerhouses are 3.188 MW and 0.6 MW, respectively. Id. 
A MW is a unit of power. One MW is a million watts per second.  
132. Keno Dam is the first KHP dam on the mainstem of the Klamath River,
located about twenty-two river miles below Link River Dam. Id. § 2.1.1.2. Keno Dam is 
relatively small, only twenty-five feet tall, and does not contain any hydroelectric 
facilities. Id. Keno Dam is significant, however, because it creates the Keno Reservoir, 
a twenty-two mile impoundment on the Klamath River that provides water to 41 
percent of the lands irrigated by the Klamath Irrigation Project and the Lower 
Klamath Lake National Wildlife Refuge. Id. Article 55 of PacifiCorp’s license for the 
KHP requires PacifiCorp to manage the Keno Dam under an agreement with BOR 
that ensures certain water levels in the Keno Reservoir for BOR’s Klamath Irrigation 
Project irrigators. Id.  
133. J.C. Boyle Dam is located ten river miles below Keno Dam and has a total
authorized capacity of 97.98 MW. Id. § 2.1.1.3. Below J.C. Boyle Dam are Copco No. 1 
and Copco No. 2 Dams, with an authorized capacity of 20 MW and 27.0 MW, 
respectively. Id. §§ 2.1.1.4, 2.1.1.5. The final dam located on the mainstem of the 
Klamath River is Iron Gate Dam, with an authorized capacity of 18 MW. Id. The eighth 
facility of the KHP is Fall Creek Dam, a small dam located on Fall Creek, a tributary to 
the Iron Gate Reservoir. Id. § 2.1.1.6. 
134. Id.
135. The KHP produces 716,820 megawatt-hours (“MWh”). A MWh is a unit of
energy. One MWh represents a million watts (“MW”) of power applied over the period 
of an hour. The 716,820 megawatt-hours (“MWh”) of energy produced by the KHP is 
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comparison, the average capacity for one of PacifiCorp’s coal, geothermal, or 
natural gas plants is 571 MW,136 and the capacity of the Grand Coulee Dam 
on the Columbia River is 6795 MW.137  The KHP accounts for only 1.8 percent 
of PacifiCorp’s total generating capacity.138 
For an adult salmon returning from the Pacific Ocean to spawn in the 
Klamath River or one of its tributaries, Iron Gate Dam, located 196.8 miles 
from the mouth of the Klamath River, represents an abrupt barrier.  Iron 
Gate Dam provides no fish passage, eliminating 570 stream-miles of 
anadromous fish habitat above the dam.139  Above Iron Gate Dam, Copco 
No. 1 and No. 2 dams also provide no fish passage.140  J. C. Boyle Dam is 
equipped with structures that provide downstream fish passage through a 
single, 24-inch diameter fish screen bypass pipe that releases twenty cubic 
feet per second (“cfs”) of flow below the dam, and upstream fish passage by 
a 569-foot long pool and weir fishway.141  These facilities, however, are used 
only by resident fish, and the NMFS has determined the facilities are 
inadequate for anadromous fish migration.142  Keno Dam provides limited 
fish passage for some species, but the passage does not meet agency 
criteria for federally listed Lost River and shortnosed suckers.143  The 570 
river miles of historic salmon habitat blocked by the KHP and Link River 
Dam reduce anadromous fish habitat in the Klamath River Basin by 75 
percent.144   
equivalent to 81.94 MW of power. Id. at xxxiii; see Spain, supra note 6, at 101 n.207 and 
accompanying text. 
136. PacifiCorp, Thermal Generation, http://www.pacificorp.com/Navigation/
Navigation591.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2009); see Spain, supra note 6, at 101 n.208 
and accompanying text.   
137. Bonneville Power Administration, 2007 BPA Facts, available at
http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/about_BPA/Facts/FactDocs/BPA_Facts_2007.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2009).  
138. FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 1.2.
139. C.W. HUNTINGTON, ESTIMATES OF ANADROMOUS FISH RUNS ABOVE THE SITE OF IRON
GATE DAM 4 (2006) available at http://www.klamathbasincrisis.org/settlement/ 
documents/Huntington(2006)-FishEstimatesUpdate.pdf; see also FERC FEIS, supra 
note 1, § 2.1.1.7; see also Spain, supra note 6, at 102–3.  
140. FERC FEIS, supra note 1, §§ 2.1.1.4, 2.1.1.5.
141. Id.
142. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, 2002 BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 27 (2002).
143. FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 5.2.8. “At Keno Dam the existing fishway does
not meet current criteria to accomplish lamprey passage because corners and ladder 
steps are not rounded. Resident lamprey ammocoetes (juveniles) already rear within 
tributaries within the Project.”  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND NATIONAL MARINE 
FISHERIES SERVICE MODIFIED PRESCRIPTIONS FOR FISHWAYS AND ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 18 AND SECTION 33 OF THE FEDERAL POWER ACT FOR THE KLAMATH 
HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT 25 (2007) (internal citation omitted).  
144. FERC Docket No. P-2082-027 avaialable at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/
search/fercgensearch.asp (select “Field Date,” enter “From” 12/4/2006, enter “To” 
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In addition to the loss of habitat due to blocked passage, the Klamath 
River dams contribute to several serious downstream water quality issues 
that severely limit salmon populations.145  High water temperatures, low 
dissolved-oxygen levels, high levels of ammonia, toxic algae blooms, and 
high nutrient concentrations are all exacerbated by, if not directly caused by 
the dams and their reservoirs.146  Of particular concern is one species of 
blue-green algae known as Microcystis aeruginosa.147  Microcystis creates 
microcystin, a potent toxin that causes serious liver damage in fish, wildlife, 
and humans.148  Iron Gate, Copco, and Keno dams create reservoirs with 
warm, stagnant water, ideal breeding conditions for Microcystis.  As a result of 
the artificial conditions, water samples taken from Iron Gate and Copco 
reservoirs have shown some of the highest levels of Microcystis in the world.149  
When water is released from behind the dams, the toxin washes into the 
Klamath River where it bioaccumulates in fish, creating serious health risks 
for ecosystems, fishermen, and consumers.150  Dam removal would drain the 
reservoirs where Microcystis breeds and dramatically reduce, if not eliminate, 
the threat to fish and people.151 
B. The Klamath Hydroelectric Project Relicensing Process
In 2004, PacifiCorp applied to FERC for a relicense to operate the 
12/4/2006, enter “Docket Number” P-2082, select submit, and scroll down to 
“Comments of INSTITUTE FOR FISHERIES RESOURCES, Pacific Coast Federation of 
Fishermen’s Associations (“PCFFA”) and others on DEIS under P-2082” [hereinafter 
Fishermen’s Comments]. 
145. See Spain, supra note 6, at 110–13.
146. FERC FEIS § 3.3.2.1.1., 3-95.
147. Id. § 3.3.2.1.2., 3-111.
148. See Spain, supra note 6 at 111 (citing Maria G. Antoniou et al.,
Cyanotoxins: New Generation of Water Contaminants, 131 J. ENVTL. ENGINEERING 1239, 
1239 (2005); S. Pichardo et al., Toxic Effects Produced by Microcystins From a Natural 
Cyanobacterial Bloom and a Microcystis aeruginosa Isolated Strain on the Fish Cell 
Lines RTG-2 and PLHC-1, 51 Archives of Envtl. Contamination & Toxicology 86, 86-87 
(2006)).  
149. See Spain, supra note 6 at 112 (citing V.F. Magalhaes et al., Microcystins
(Cyanobacteria Hepatotoxins) Bioaccumulation in Fish and Crustaceans from 
Sepetiba Bay (Brasil, R.J.), 42 Toxicon 289, 289-90 (2003)). Water samples taken in the 
summer of 2006 from the Iron Gate and Copco reservoirs showed levels of Microcystis 
aeruginosa that “exceeded the World Health Organization’s moderate-risk-exposure 
standard by more than 3900 times” and that were “among the highest recorded in the 
world.”  Spain, supra note 5 at 111–12 (citing Memorandum from Jacob Kann of 
Aquatic Ecosystem Sciences on Cyanobacteria Results from July 13th and 27th, 2006, 
at 1 (Aug. 8, 2006); Memorandum from Jacob Kann of Aquatic Ecosystem Sciences on 
Cyanobacteria Results from August 7th-8th, 2006, at 1 (Aug. 21, 2006)).  
150. Id.
151. See id.
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KHP.152  After two years of study and consultation, in 2006, the FWS and the 
NMFS filed comments, including recommended terms and conditions for 
the KHP.153  Included in the comments were preliminary fishway 
prescriptions under section 18 of the FPA154 and recommended conditions 
under both sections 10(j) and 10(a) of the FPA.155  Although the 
recommended conditions under sections 10(j) and 10(a) were not binding 
on FERC,156 the recommendations were significant because they called for 
extensive mitigation and monitoring of anadromous fish outside of the 
project boundary (under section 10(j))157 and removal of the four lower dams 
(under section 10(a)).158  Three days after NMFS’s filing, the Bureau of Land 
Management (“BLM”) and BOR (Interior agencies) each filed section 4(e) 
preliminary conditions that required PacifiCorp to construct streamflow 
monitoring stations throughout the KHP and to guarantee levels of releases 
from J.C. Boyle Dam.159  
Moving quickly to take advantage of the decision in American Rivers v. 
U.S. Department of the Interior, which extended the rights of the EPA to both 
applicants and parties in pending license proceedings,160  PacifiCorp filed a 
request for hearings on fourteen disputed issues of material fact regarding 
both the section 4(e) conditions and the section 18 prescriptions.161  
Simultaneously, PacifiCorp filed its own alternative prescriptions and 
152. See In re Klamath Hydroelectric Project, No. 2006-NMFS-0001  at 3 (NOAA
Fisheries Sept. 27, 2006), available at http://elibrary.fercwww.fws.gov/idmws/common/ 
opennat.asp?fileID=11146718yreka/P2082/20060927/2Klamath_DNO_Final.pdf 
[hereinafter In Re Klamath]. FERC Responded by issuing a Notice of Application Ready 
for Environmental Analysis, including a Request for Preliminary Prescriptions and 
Conditions. See id.  
153. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV. & U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., PRELIMINARY FISH 
PRESCRIPTIONS C-5 (2006) [hereinafter COMMERCE PRELIMINARY FISH PRESCRIPTIONS], 
available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=10985726. 
154. Id. Section 18 prescriptions are mandatory. See infra Part II.A.1.
155. COMMERCE PRELIMINARY FISH PRESCRIPTIONS, supra note 153.
156. See supra Part II.A.1; see American Rivers II, 201 F.3d at 1208-10 (holding that
recommended conditions under 10(j) are non-binding on FERC); see Blumm & Nadol, 
supra note 15 at 114–6 (explaining interpretations of section 10 conditions). 
157. COMMERCE PRELIMINARY FISH PRESCRIPTIONS, supra note 161, app. B.
158. Id. app. C.
159. FWS filed their section 18 preliminary prescriptions along with BLM and
BOR’s section 4(e) preliminary conditions. FWS’s section 18 preliminary 
prescriptions were identical to NMFS section 18 preliminary prescriptions because 
the two agencies consulted with each other on the content of the prescriptions. See In 
Re Klamath, at 4, n.2.  
160. See supra Part II.A.3.
161. See Letter from Anne K. Dailey, Troutman Sanders LLP, to Magalie Roman
Salas, Sec’y, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (Apr. 28, 2006), available at http:// 
elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=11016462. PacifiCorp filed less 
than two months after the ruling in American Rivers v. U.S. Department of the Interior. 
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conditions which called for more studies into anadromous fish habitat 
above the dams and a plan to trap fish below the project, transport the fish 
around the dams in trucks, and release the fish in the river above the dams 
(“trap and haul”).162  PacifiCorp’s alternative conditions and prescriptions 
would not require construction of fishways, and therefore would be 
significantly cheaper to implement.163  
After the first full hearing conducted under the 2005 EPA, 
Administrative Law Judge Parlen McKenna ruled in favor of the agencies on 
twelve of the fourteen issues of fact.164  Most significantly, the agencies 
succeeded in showing that anadromous fish had historically lived above Iron 
Gate Dam, and that allowing salmon access to the river above Iron Gate 
Dam would benefit the depleted species.165  At the end of the hearing, the 
agencies submitted modified section 4(e) conditions and section 18 
prescriptions that were substantially similar to the preliminary conditions.166  
The NMFS also reaffirmed the recommended condition to remove the four 
lower dams under section 10.167   
1. The ‘Real’ Value of the KHP after Modified Prescriptions
and Conditions
The NMFS and FWS jointly filed modified prescriptions for the KHP in 
January 2007.168  After acknowledging that recommendations to remove the 
dams under section 10 of the EPA were non-binding on FERC,169 the 
agencies acted under section 18, imposing binding prescriptions for the 
KHP170 as well as binding fishway prescriptions for the four major dams.171  
162. FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 2.3.1.3. Id.
163. See id.
164. In re Klamath, No. 2006-NMFS-0001 at 6 (NOAA Fisheries Sept. 27, 2006).
165. Id.
166. FERC FEIS, supra note, 1, § 2.3.1.3, 2-27. “The modified prescriptions
include[d] revisions to downstream fishway prescriptions at Copco No. 1 tailraces, 
spillway prescriptions at all project developments, and bypass/attraction flow 
changes.”  Id.  
167. See Letter from Rodney R. McInnis, NMFS, to Magalie Roman Salas, Sec’y,
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (Jan. 26, 2007). 
168. Id.
169. See supra Part II.A.1. (discussing section 10 of the FPA).
170. FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 2.3.1.3, 2-27–29.  The general prescriptions
called for PacifiCorp to, among other things: design and construct all fish screens 
and fishways in a manner consistent with NMFS guidelines; keep all fishways in 
proper order, clear of trash, sediment, logs, debris, and other material that would 
hinder passage; develop post-construction monitoring and evaluation plans to 
assess the effectiveness of all prescribed structures; and design each upstream fish 
passage facility to pass migrants throughout a designed streamflow range. Id.  
171. Id. § 2.3.1.3, 2-27.
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The fishway prescriptions included new fish ladders at Iron Gate, Copco No. 
1, and Copco No. 2; redesigned fish ladders at J.C. Boyle; new fish screens 
and bypasses at all dams; tailrace barriers at Copco No. 1, Copco No. 2, and 
J.C. Boyle; and spillway modifications for all four dams.172  The Interior
agencies filed modified conditions under section 4(e) of the FPA in January,
2007,173 requiring PacifiCorp to, among other things, release minimum flows
from J.C. Boyle dam during specific times throughout the year, maintain a
minimum level in the Keno Reservoir and establish new streamflow
monitoring stations at various sites throughout the KHP.174
In its Final Environmental Impact Statement, FERC weighed the costs 
of the section 4(e) conditions and the section 18 prescriptions against the 
benefits of energy generation at the KHP.175  Under the renewed license, the 
KHP would generate an average of only 533,879 MWh of electricity annually - 
down twenty-five percent from the annual average of 716,820 MWh.176  FERC 
projected the annual value of the power generated by the KHP after 
imposing the conditions and prescriptions to be about $25 million.177  After 
complying with the mandatory conditions and prescriptions, FERC 
estimated the total annual cost of operating the KHP to be over $46 million, 
thus projecting the net annual loss to PacifiCorp of operating the KHP under 
the new conditions and prescriptions to be more than $20 million.178  After 
mitigating its environmental impacts, the KHP would no longer be 
economically viable.  The FPA’s mandatory federal conditioning authorities 
thus forced the parties to plan for dam removal.  
2. The Certifications That Never Were
PacifiCorp applied to the Oregon Department of Environmental 
Quality (“DEQ”) and the California Water Resources Control Board (“WRCB”) 
for state Section 401(c) certification in March 2006.179  Under the CWA, DEQ 
and WRCB must deny 401(c) certification if the agencies determine the 
172. Id. § 2.3.1.3, tbl. 2-2.
173. See id. § 2.3.1.4, 2-32.
174. Id. § 2.3.1.4, tbls. 2-3, 2-4.




179. Id. § 2.3.1.1, 2-27. Because the KHP straddles the Oregon-California
border, the laws of both states applied to PacifiCorp’s attempt to relicense the 
project. One result of the dams being in two states was that PacifiCorp needed to 
obtain 401(c) certification from two states, requiring PacifiCorp to navigate two 
dissimilar state administrative programs. One difference between Oregon and 
California’s 401(c) programs is that 401(c) certification in California triggers the need 
for the WRCB to analyze environmental impacts under CEQA. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 
21000 et seq.      
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project will not meet effluent limitations, state laws, or other limitations.180  
A state has one year to respond to an application for water quality 
certification, and if a state fails to respond within one year of receiving the 
application, the state waives the certification requirement.181 
One month before the deadline for state action on the application, 
neither Oregon nor California had certified the license.182  Anticipating a 
denial of certification, PacifiCorp withdrew its applications from both states 
on February 28, 2007, and resubmitted the applications that same day in 
order to push back the deadline for certification one year.183  California and 
Oregon made clear that the applications remained inadequate, and that 
without additional data, each state would deny certification.184  Because 
state water quality certification is mandatory,185 and because Oregon and 
California took such strong stances on ensuring water quality, the Clean 
Water Act played a significant role in encouraging the parties to reach the 
AIP.  Even if PacifiCorp backed out of the KHSA and agreed to construct fish 
passage,186 the dams would remain in place and water quality would not 
improve.187  Therefore, the Clean Water Act will continue to provide a critical 
incentive for the parties to ultimately agree on dam removal. 
180. See infra Part II.B. Oregon DEQ and California WRCB list the Klamath as
water-quality limited under section 303(d) of the CWA for several pollutants in both 
Oregon and California. Or. Department of Environmental Quality, Water Quality 
Assessment Database, http://www.deq.state.or.us/wq/assessment/rpt0406/search.asp 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009) (choose “Klamath River” as water body and “All 
Parameters” as parameter); Cal. Environmental Protection Agency, Board Approved 
2006 Clean Water Act Section 303(d) List of Water Quality Limited Segments 7–13 
(2006), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/tmdl/docs/ 
303dlists2006/swrcb/ r1_final303dlist.pdf. 
181. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1977).
182. FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 2.3.1.1, 2-27.
183. See Letter from Elizabeth Lawson, Cal. Water Res. Control Eng’r, State
Water Res. Control Bd., to Cory Scott, Project Manager, PacifiCorp Energy (Mar. 20, 
2007), available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.
asp?fileID=11316001; see Spain, supra note 6, at 112 n.261 and accompanying text. 
184. Letter from Elizabeth Lawson, Water Res. Control Eng’r, Cal. Water Res.
Control Bd., to Cory Scott, Project Manager, PacifiCorp Energy 11 (Feb. 26, 2007), 
available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=11289671; see 
Spain, supra note 5, at 112 n.262 and accompanying text. 
185. See infra Part II.B.
186. AIP, supra note 24, § III.
187. See supra Part III.B.
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IV. Evaluating the Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement
Agreement
On November 13, 2008, the states and PacifiCorp signed an 
“Agreement in Principal” addressing removal of the four major dams on the 
Klamath River.188  Negotiated and signed by the Bush administration, the 
AIP outlined a nonbinding framework for the decommissioning, transfer of 
ownership, and removal of Iron Gate, Copco 1, Copco 2, and J.C. Boyle dams 
by 2020.189  In addition to planning for dam removal, the AIP embraced the 
proposed Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement (proposed KBRA),190 an 
earlier agreement among Klamath stakeholders on water reallocation and 
fisheries restoration.191  
The AIP called for a final agreement on dam removal by June 30, 
2009.192  On that date, after only six months in office, the Obama 
administration announced that an agreement on dam removal was “within 
reach” and extended the deadline to September 2009.193  On September 30, 
2009, the parties to the AIP and forty-two stakeholder groups announced - 
but did not sign - the public review draft of the Klamath Hydroelectric 
Settlement Agreement (“KHSA”).194  The KHSA retained the basic structure 
and timeline of the AIP and required that the KHSA be signed concurrently 
with the KBRA.195  After another four months of negotiations, on January 7, 
2010, the parties released updated public review drafts of both agreements 
for the parties to consider and sign by February 2010.196  Finally, on February 
188. DOI News Release, supra note 26.
189. AIP, supra note 25 at 2, 7. The AIP contemplated several dates for dam
removal, the latest being 2025. Id.  
190. Id. § IV.
191. See KBRA, supra note 29.
192. AIP, supra note 25, § II.B.i.
193. News Release, U.S. Department of the Interior, Salazar: Klamath Basin
Agreement “Within Reach” (July 30th, 2009), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/ 
pressreleases/2009_06_30_releaseC.cfm. 
194. KHSA, supra note 27. News Release, U.S. Department of the Interior,
Secretary Salazar Announces Draft Agreement on Klamath Dam Removal Proposal 
(September 30, 2009), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/ 2009_09_30 
_release.cfm. 
195. Compare AIP, supra note 25 with KHSA, supra note 27; KHSA, supra note 27 § 2.2. 
196. See Colin Miner, Reaching Consensus on the Klamath, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2010,
available at http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/11/reaching-consensus-on-the-
klamath/?scp=1&sq=Klamath&st=cse; SUMMARY, KLAMATH HYDROELECTRIC SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT 1, Jan. 7, 2010. On January 19, the Klamath Tribe became the first party to 
sign the two agreements. Associated Press, Klamath Tribes OK basin restoration agreement, 
MONTEREY COUNTY HERALD (Jan. 20, 2010), available at 
http://www.montereyherald.com/state/ci_14233039.  On January 28, the Karuk Tribal 
Council voted unanimously to support the two agreements.  Press Release, Karuk 
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18, 2010, over fifty parties signed the two agreements in the Oregon Capitol 
Rotunda in Salem.197 
With 427 FERC hydroelectric licenses expiring in the next 20 years,198 
the KHSA could represent an influential model for resolving future 
relicensing disputes.  Beyond the private hydroelectric project relicensing 
process, Klamath dam removal, if successful, could open the door for 
removing even larger federally owned dams.199  This Section analyzes the 
major components of the KHSA, assessing the viability of dam removal by 
2020 and evaluates the public policy underlying the agreement. 
A. The Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement and
Combined Federal Legislation
About a year before the parties announced the AIP, on January 15, 
2008, the Klamath Settlement Group (“KSG”) announced the proposed KBRA 
on water allocation and fisheries restoration in the Klamath Basin.200  The 
KSG included three of the parties to the AIP - the states of Oregon and 
California and the federal government - but did not include PacifiCorp.201  
Tribe, Karuk Tribe Formally Approves Klamath Restoration Agreements (Jan. 28, 
2010), available at http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2010/01/29/18636586.php.  
197. See KHSA, supra note 27; KBRA, supra note 29; News Release, U.S.
Department of the Interior, Secretary Salazar, Governors Kulongoski and 
Schwarzenegger Announce Agreement on Klamath River Basin Restoration (Feb. 18, 
2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/2010_02_18_release.cfm.  At 
the signing Governor Schwarzenegger said, “It’s time to say hasta la vista to the dams 
on the Klamath River.”  See KRDV, Historic Klamath Basin water agreements signed 
in Salem, http://kdrv.com/page/163064 (Feb. 18, 2010).   
198. FERC, COMPLETE LIST OF ISSUED LICENSES Column G (2009), available at,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/app-new.asp.  
199. See Daniel Jack Chasan, How taking out dams splits environmental groups,
CROSSCUT (Nov. 3, 2009), available at http://www.oregonwild.org/about/press-
room/press-clips/how-taking-out-dams-splits-environmental-groups (explaining how 
some environmental groups hope the KHSA might lead to removing four dams on 
the lower Snake River) [hereinafter Chasan]. For a critique of the most recent 
proposal for mitigating the impact of the Snake River dams on salmon see Michael 
Blumm, Obama disappoints when it comes to salmon, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Oct. 13, 2009), 
available at http://www.hcn.org/wotr/obama-disappoints-when-it-comes-to-salmon.  
200. PROPOSED KLAMATH RIVER BASIN RESTORATION AGREEMENT FOR THE
SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC AND TRUST RESOURCES AND AFFECTED COMMUNITIES (2008), 
http://www.edsheets.com/Klamathdocs.html [hereinafter PROPOSED KBRA]. Press 
Release, Klamath Settlement Group, Klamath Settlement Group Releases Proposed 
Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement for Public Review (Jan. 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.edsheets.com/Klamathdocs.html. [hereinafter KBRA Press Release]. 26 
parties comprised the KSG and negotiated the terms of the KBRA over a two-year 
period.  Id.  
201. In addition to representatives from the U.S. Departments of Agriculture,
Commerce, and the Interior and Oregon and California’s natural resource 
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The proposed KBRA attempted to reallocate and reduce water diverted for 
upstream irrigation while improving in stream flow for anadromous fish.202  
Anticipating an agreement like the AIP, the proposed KBRA called for a 
separate “Hydropower Agreement” with PacifiCorp to remove the four major 
Klamath River dams,203 and required that the proposed KBRA could only be 
finalized in conjunction with a final agreement on dam removal.204  Ten 
months after the KSG announced the proposed KBRA, the parties to the AIP 
embraced the KBRA, agreeing that the KBRA and the final hydropower 
agreement would be “indivisible parts of a unified approach to resolving 
Klamath Basin issues in the broad public interest.”205  In the KHSA, the 
parties went a step further and explicitly required that all parties except 
PacifiCorp must execute the KHSA and KBRA concurrently.206  On February 
18, 2010, over fifty parties signed the final KBRA, a sprawling, 172-page 
agreement.207 
The goals of the KBRA are to 1) restore and sustain fish populations 
that can support robust ocean and river harvest opportunities; 2) establish 
reliable water and power for agriculture, communities, and National Wildlife 
Refuges; and 3) promote the sustainability of all Klamath Basin 
communities, including mitigating the effects of dam removal.208  The KBRA 
calls for a series of programs and assurances to be coordinated by the 
Klamath Basin Coordinating Council (Council), a novel basin-wide 
governance structure.209  Under the KBRA, the Council would oversee nearly 
$1 billion in spending over the first ten years of implementation, with ninety 
percent of the funds going to anadromous fisheries restoration and water 
departments, the KSG included representatives from four tribes, three counties, 
environmental groups, agricultural and fishing interests, and landowners from inside 
and outside the Klamath Irrigation Project. Id. 
202. Id.
203. See Proposed KBRA, supra note 200, at Part II; SUMMARY, PROPOSED KLAMATH 
BASIN RESTORATION AGREEMENT 1 (Jan. 15, 2008), http://www.edsheets.com/ 
Klamathdocs.html [hereinafter PROPOSED KBRA SUMMARY].  
204. The proposed KBRA called for a final KBRA to be executed concurrently
with the Hydropower Agreement. PROPOSED KBRA, supra note 200, §§ 1.5, 8.4.1, 39. 
205. AIP, supra note 25, § IV.
206. KHSA, supra note 27, § 2.2.
207. KBRA, supra note 29. Including the table of contents and appendices, the
KBRA is 369-pages long. 
208. SUMMARY, KLAMATH BASIN RESTORATION AGREEMENT 1 (Jan. 7, 2010)
[hereinafter KBRA SUMMARY]. 
209. KBRA, supra note 29, app. D-1.  The KBRA itself makes it clear, however,
that this new “governance” structure will not supersede or change any existing 
governmental authorities, serving more as an inter-Party coordination and planning 
entity intended to help implement the KBRA’s many restoration programs.  Id. 
§.2.2.1.
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provisions.210  Of the nearly $1 billion, 60 percent would come from funds 
already allocated to various programs in the Klamath Basin.211  The 
remaining forty percent would require additional funds from the federal 
government, but the parties to the KBRA estimate that this $400 million 
over the next ten years would be less than the average amount of federal 
money historically spent on federal disaster relief in the basin.212  In addition 
to the restoration program, the KBRA calls for substantial changes to the 
schedules, plans, and other provisions governing how irrigation water is 
delivered to the Klamath Reclamation Project, upper Klamath Basin, and the 
National Wildlife Refuges.213  
Both the KBRA and KHSA depend on federal legislation.214  The KBRA 
calls for federal legislation to, among other things, authorize the Secretary 
to execute the agreement and provide or redirect $970 million in federal 
appropriations over ten years.215  The KHSA calls for legislation to, among 
other things, authorize the Secretary to designate a Dam Removal Entity 
(“DRE”) to take title to the dams and take them down, require FERC to issue 
PacifiCorp one-year temporary licenses for the KHP until transfer to the 
DRE, authorize transfer of Keno Dam from PacifiCorp to Interior, and 
immunize PacifiCorp from liability associated with dam removal after the 
DRE takes title to the dams.216  Because legislation for both agreements will 
be offered to Congress as one bill, dam removal cannot proceed 
independently of the significant federal appropriations required by the 
KBRA.217 
Although a broad coalition of stakeholders signed the KBRA, the 
agreement divided environmental groups.218  In March 2008, the Northcoast 
210. Id. app. C-2; KBRA SUMMARY, supra note 208, at 10.
211. PROPOSED KBRA SUMMARY, supra note 200, at 10.
212. For example, in 2006, federal disaster relief for the Klamath fisheries
collapse totaled $60.4 million. See Glen Spain, No River Left Behind, Why Every Salmon 
River Is Important, http://www.pcffa.org/fn-jun08.htm (last visited April 22, 2009).  
213. KBRA, supra note 29, §§ 14–20. The KBRA also outlined a process to
develop Habitat Conservation Plans (“HCPs”) to assist non-federal parties in 
complying with the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). KBRA, supra note 29, § 22. See 
also Ullman, supra note 7, at 8 (stating that the ESA provisions of the KBRA should 
shift the regulatory framework in the Klamath Basin “from Section 7 and occasional 
Biological Opinions, to more predictable Habitat Conservation Plans). 
214. KHSA, supra note 27, app. E.
215. Id. KBRA, supra note 29, app. C-2.
216. KHSA, supra note 27, app. E; see infra Parts V.E. (discussing the DRE and
immunity for PacifiCorp), V.D. (discussing Keno Dam). 
217. KHSA, supra note 27, § 2.1.1. The states are responsible for funding dam
removal. See infra Part IV.C. 
218. See Janine Robben, Navigating Water Law in Oregon, 69 OR. ST. B. BULL. 17, 20.
“Some of the organizations that have been concerned about Klamath Basin water for 
years, most notably some environmental groups, did not sign off on it, which may 
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Environmental Center (“NEC”)219 - a longtime champion of Klamath River 
dam removal—announced it did not support the KBRA.220  Relying on two 
commissioned studies,221 NEC concluded that the KBRA did not guarantee 
adequate stream flows for fish.222  Supporters of the KBRA - including other 
environmental organizations and fishermen’s groups223 - disagree, pointing 
result in collateral attacks.”  Id. See Chasan, supra note 209. Early opposition also 
came from landowners and politicians in Siskiyou County, California, who objected 
to provisions allowing tribal and agency biologists to design the fisheries restoration 
program and argued that the council structure did not include a representative 
population from the mid-Klamath Basin.  Marcia Armstrong, Siskiyou County 
Supervisor, Klamath River Dams – Agreement in Principal (“AIP”), Siskiyou County 
Supervisors Weekly Column (Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www. 
klamathbasincrisis.org/MarciaArmstrong/KlamathDamsAIP112508.htm.  
219. The Northcoast Environmental Center is a non-profit organization based
in Arcata, California and was one of the twenty-six parties that announced the 
proposed KBRA. PROPOSED KBRA, supra note 200, § 1. NEC’s mission is “to promote 
understanding of the relations between people and the biosphere and to conserve, 
protect and celebrate terrestrial, aquatic and marine ecosystems of northern 
California and southern Oregon.”  NEC, Our Mission, http://yournec.org/modules 
.php?op=modload&name=PagEd&file=index&page_id=360 (last visited April 22, 2009). 
220. News Release, Northcoast Environmental Center, NEC Rejects Klamath
Agreement (March 3, 2008) available at http://humboldtherald.wordpress.com/ 
2008/03/03/nec-rejects-klamath-agreement-news-release/ [hereinafter NEC News 
Release]. 
221. GREG KAMMAN, INDEPENDENT MODEL REVIEW FOR KLAMATH SETTLEMENT
NEGOTIATIONS, KLAMATH INDEPENDENT REVIEW PROJECT (“KIRP”) (Nov. 2007); BILL TRUSH,
COMMENTARY ON THE KLAMATH RIVER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (Nov. 2007).  
222. See NEC News Release, supra note 220.  The studies also concluded that
the KBRA provided quantitative guarantees of water for agriculture users, but 
included no guarantees for stream flows for fish during dry years or during drier 
months of average years.  Id.  NEC also quoted Thomas Hardy, author of Hydrology, 
Ecology and the Fishes of the Klamath River Basin, as stating that under the KBRA, 
agriculture will be “taking too much water from the system” in dry years.  See id. 
Models project the river will go well below 1,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) during 
drier parts of the year under the KBRA.  Id.  “Flows that resulted in the 2002 fish kill, 
which killed nearly 70,000 adult Chinook salmon, were between 600 and 700 cfs.”  Id. 
See also KLAMATH CONSERVATION PARTNERS, OUTLINE OF OBJECTIONS TO THE KLAMATH BASIN
RESTORATION AND HYDROELECTRIC SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 1 (Jan. 10, 2010) (claiming 
that “[t]he water balance, guaranteeing diversion of 330,000 acre-feet for irrigators, 
has no scientific basis and will, in 40 percent of water years, leave too little water in 
the Klamath River to meet the current Coho Salmon BiOp flow requirements.  There 
are no guaranteed flows for fish.”).  However, the author of one of those NEC 
commissioned studies, Dr. Kamman, and Dr. Hardy as well, have since changed their 
views and both now support the KBRA flows as adequate for salmon recovery when 
coupled with dam removal.  See http://www.klamathriverrestoration.org/index. 
php/issues/fisheries.html. 
223. American Rivers, California Trout, Institute for Fisheries Resources,
Northern California/Nevada Council Federation of Fly Fishers, Pacific Coast 
Federation of Fishermen’s Associations, Salmon River Restoration Council, and Trout 
Unlimited all signed the KBRA.  KBRA, supra note 29, at 2. 
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to KBRA programs to limit water diversions,224 retire water uses,225 and 
authorize the Secretary to make real-time water management decisions to 
benefit fish.226  These provisions notwithstanding, in December 2009, NEC 
and a small coalition of environmental groups withdrew their support for the 
KHSA citing, among other things, the linkage between the KHSA and 
KBRA.227  In addition to the lack of assurances on stream flows, the Klamath 
Conservation Partners (“KCP”) argued that combining controversial 
legislation and appropriations called for by the KBRA with legislation 
needed for dam removal could derail the KHSA.228  As an alternative, the 
KCP put forward alternative “clean and clear” dam removal legislation that 
did not include ties to the KBRA.229 
The KBRA-KHSA linkage highlights a major policy concern for future 
dam removal projects.  On the one hand, the KCP make a strong argument 
that negotiations, agreements, and legislation needed for dam removal 
should be separated from issues related to fisheries restoration (which is 
expensive) and water allocation (which is extremely contentious).  Why 
complicate and jeopardize a plan for dam removal with additional parties 
and controversies? On the other hand, dam removal provides a unique 
opportunity for comprehensive river restoration because the key 
governmental parties are each at the negotiating table and focused on the 
issue.  Further, to achieve the most environmental benefit as soon as 
possible, dam removal should be followed by habitat restoration.230  Why not 
then coordinate the two processes to ensure the most environmental benefit 
in the shortest amount of time? Also, including stakeholders early in the 
process may reduce the risk of collateral attacks down the road.231   
Lessons from the Klamath will not help to fully answer these questions 
for a decade, but the existence and content of the two agreements offer a 
starting point.  Notwithstanding objections from some environmental 
224. KBRA, supra note 29, § 20.2.2.
225. Id. § 20.2.3.
226. Id. § 20.3.3.
227. KLAMATH CONSERVATION PARTNERS, GUIDANCE STATEMENT 1, (Dec. 15, 2009)
available at http://www.oregonwild.org/waters/klamath/a-vision-for-the-klamath-basin/ 
klamath-conservation-partners.  
228. Id. at 3.
229. THE KLAMATH FACILITIES REMOVAL ACT 2010: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE KHSA
(Dec. 15, 2009) available at http://www.oregonwild.org/waters/klamath/a-vision-for-the-
klamath-basin/klamath-conservation-partners.    
230. See WILLIAM R. LOWRY, DAM POLITICS: RESTORING AMERICA’S RIVERS 61–2 (2003)
(describing the benefits of dam removal and habitat restoration).  For time-lapse 
animation sequences depicting restoration of the Klamath River see American 
Rivers, Envisioning a Restored Klamath River, http://www.americanrivers.org/our-
work/restoring-rivers/dams/projects/envisioning-a-restored-klamath.html (2010). 
231. See infra Part V.G.
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groups, the KBRA and KHSA achieved broad support from diverse 
stakeholder groups.232  This consensus alone offers some credence for the 
comprehensive river restoration approach.  However, compromises in the 
KBRA and KHSA drove some parties to reject both agreements, leaving 
these stakeholders in a position to challenge permits, authorizations, and 
legislation needed for dam removal.233  More troubling, controversy 
surrounding the KBRA, including its price tag, looms as a major threat to 
needed dam removal legislation and jeopardizes dam removal altogether. 
In the end, the efficacy of the KBRA-KHSA package and the comprehensive 
river restoration model will be measured by the success or failure of the 
ultimate goal of the KHSA - dam removal by 2020.234  As explained below, 
success is far from a sure thing. 
B. How and When to Decide: Federal Studies and
Determination by 2012
The KHSA is not an agreement to remove the four Klamath dams.235  
Instead, the agreement calls for further studies236 and environmental review 
to inform a determination by the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) on 
whether or not to proceed with dam removal.237  Several conditions must be 
met before the Secretary can reach his determination: 1) Congress must 
adopt legislation;238  2) the Secretary and PacifiCorp must agree on transfer 
of Keno Dam;239  3) the states must authorize funding for dam removal and 
the parties must agree on a plan for excess costs;240 and 4) the Secretary 
must identify a suitable dam removal entity (“DRE”).241  Further, the 
232. See KBRA, supra note 29, at 2.
233. See infra Part V.G.
234. KHSA, supra note 27, § 7.3.1.
235. See id. § 3.1.
236. In April 2009, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar approved $4 million in federal
stimulus funds to contract the studies called for by the AIP.  See The Associated 
Press, Stimulus Money Pays for Klamath Dam Removal Study, THE OREGONIAN, April 19, 
2009, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2009/04/stimulus_ 
money_pays_for_klamat.html; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-5, 2009.  The approval was significant because it allowed BOR to 
contract the studies without waiting for congressional approval—as designed under 
the AIP. Secretary Salazar’s use of the stimulus funds therefore increases the chances 
that the studies will be complete in time for him to make the determination on dam 
removal by March 31, 2012.  Id.  KHSA, supra note 27, § 3.2.5.A. 
237. KHSA, supra note 27, § 3.2.1.
238. Id. § 3.3.4(A); see supra Part IV.A. (explaining the challenges of combining
legislation called for by the KBRA with legislation needed for dam removal). 
239. KHSA, supra note 27, § 3.3.4(B); see infra Part IV.D. (discussing Keno Dam).
240. KHSA, supra note 27, § 3.3.4(C), (D); see infra Part IV.C. (discussing costs).
241. KHSA, supra note 27, § 3.3.4(E); see infra part IV.E. (explaining the DRE).
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Secretary may not decide to proceed with dam removal unless he 
determines that, “in his judgment,” dam removal will benefit salmon and be 
in the public interest.  
The Secretary is to use his “best efforts” to make a determination on 
dam removal by March 31, 2012.242  If one of the several conditions243 is not 
met by the deadline the Secretary cannot make his determination.  In such 
an event the parties must meet and consider modifications to the KHSA, 
potentially delaying dam removal.244  If all the conditions have been met, 
and the Secretary determines to proceed with dam removal, both Oregon 
and California have a right to veto dam removal if, “in its discretion and 
independent judgment,” a state believes “significant impacts” cannot be 
avoided or that the costs of dam removal will exceed the budget.245 
Delaying and conditioning the final determination on dam removal 
was highly controversial.246  Strong advocates for dam removal decided to 
oppose the KHSA, arguing that delaying a final determination on dam 
removal until 2012 created a two-year window for PacifiCorp and other 
parties to derail the KHSA.247  Further, if the Secretary determines not to 
proceed with dam removal, opponents to the KHSA warn that PacifiCorp 
may return to the FERC relicensing process with greater leverage to keep the 
dams and seek other means to recover the costs of mandatory conditions.248  
Moreover, because the Secretary only has control over two of the four 
preconditions for his determination 249 the ultimate fate of the KHSA will 
likely rest with Congress,250 the California public utility commissions, and 
California voters.251   
242. Id. § 3.3.4.  The KHSA retained the same deadline for a Secretarial
determination on dam removal as the AIP.  AIP, supra note 25, § III. 
243. See infra notes 238–242.
244. See KHSA, supra note 27, § 3.3.4.
245. Id. § 8.11.1.C.
246. See KLAMATH CONSERVATION PARTNERS, OUTLINE OF OBJECTIONS TO THE KBRA 
AND KHSA (Dec. 15, 2009), available at http://www.oregonwild.org/waters/klamath/a-
vision-for-the-klamath-basin/KBRA-KHSAObjections_11.09.pdf (outlining 18 
separate objections, three of which relate to the Secretary’s determination). 
247. KLAMATH CONSERVATION PARTNERS, GUIDANCE STATEMENT 3 (Dec. 15, 2009),
available at http://www.oregonwild.org/waters/klamath/a-vision-for-the-klamath-basin/ 
GuidanceonKHSA_12.18.09.pdf. 
248. Id.
249. See infra notes 239 & 241.
250. See infra Part IV.A. (explaining the need for Congress to support dam
removal legislation). 
251. See supra Part IV.C. (discussing the need for state PUCs and California
voters to approve dam removal funding).  However, failure of the California voters to 
quickly approve funding is not fatal to the Secretarial Determination, which can be 
made nonetheless if estimates show that California’s back up funding will not be 
needed or provided California can give satisfactory assurances that its portion of the 
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C. Paying for Removal
The KHSA funds dam removal from two sources: surcharges on 
PacifiCorp’s customers in Oregon and California (customer contribution);252 
and the sale of general obligation bonds in California (bonds).253  The 
customer contribution would raise $200 million by 2020, and would be 
applied first.254  California’s sale of bonds would bridge the gap between the 
$200 million customer contribution and the actual cost of facilities removal, 
if these additional funds are necessary for removal, but shall not exceed 
$250 million.255  The total $450 million dollars represent the total state 
contribution (“state cost cap”) and no party is responsible for costs beyond 
the state cost cap.256  The KHSA does not provide for additional funds if the 
project goes over budget.  Indeed, PacifiCorp and the federal government 
are expressly shielded from any costs or liability for removal.257  Instead, 
costs over budget require the parties to meet and indentify additional 
funding, also potentially delaying dam removal.258   
On February 17, 2009, the Oregon Senate approved a surcharge on the 
Oregon ratepayers of Pacific Power, the Oregon subsidiary of PacifiCorp.259  
The Oregon House of Representatives passed a similar bill on June 12,260 and 
on July 14 Oregon Governor Ted Kulongowski signed Senate Bill 76 (SB 76) 
into law.261  Under SB 76 and as structured by the KHSA,262 Oregon 
funding will be available by the date of removal.  See KHSA, supra note 27,  § 3.3.4(1) 
and (2). 
252. KHSA, supra note 27, § 4.1.1.
253. Id. § 4.1.2.
254. Id. § 4.1.1.C.
255. Id. § 4.1.2.A.
256. Id. §§ 2.1.4.D., 4.10.
257. Id. § 2.1.1.E.i. (PacifiCorp); id. § 4.10 (federal government).
258. Id. § 2.3. See id. § 8.11.1.D. (including failure by either PUC to approve the
surcharge in a list of “potential termination events” that would trigger meet and 
confer procedures).  
259. Oregon Senate Bill 76, available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/bills_laws/; see
Matt Preusch and Ted Sickinger, Senate OKs Surcharge for Dam Removal, OREGONIAN, Feb 
18, 2009, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/business/oregonian/index.ssf?/base/ 
business/1234934706182210.xml&coll=7 [hereinafter Preusch & Sickinger].  SB 76 
passed by an 18-12 vote. The vote was largely along party lines, with local Senator 
Jason Atkinson casting the lone Republic “yes” vote on SB 76. Id. Pacific Power is the 
Oregon, Washington and California subsidiary of PacifiCorp. Company Facts, supra 
note 10.  
260. See Matt Preusch, Klamath Dam Removal Bill Clears House, THE OREGONIAN,
June 13, 2009, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2009/ 
06/klamath_dam_removal_bill_passe.html. 
261. Press Release, Governor Ted Kulongowski, Governor signs bill supporting
the restoration of the Klamath River basin (July 14th, 2009), available at 
http://governor.oregon.gov/Gov/P2009/press_071409.shtml. 
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ratepayers would contribute the lion’s share of the customer contribution 
($184 million of the $200 million)263 because far more PacifiCorp customers 
live in Oregon than in California.264  
SB 76 requires the Public Utility Commission of Oregon to adopt the 
surcharge, thus securing a major portion of the initial funds needed for 
removal.265  California’s share of the customer contribution depends on the 
California Public Utilities Commission adopting a similar surcharge in that 
state to raise a maximum of $16 million.266  If either agency fails to approve 
the surcharge, the parties will meet to attempt to identify alternative 
funding, possibly delaying dam removal.267  
On November 4, 2009, the California legislature passed a 
comprehensive water package that combined four policy bills and an $11.14 
billion bond measure.268  The legislation authorized the $250 million 
Klamath bond, subject to a statewide referendum, but required the Klamath 
bond be included in the overall water bond referendum.269  Because the 
$11.4 billion bond requires approval by the California voters, the success of 
the Klamath bond is dependent on popular support for the entire bond 
measure, titled The Safe, Clean, and Reliable Drinking Water Supply Act of 
2010 (Water Supply Act).270  A referendum for the Water Supply Act is 
scheduled for November 2010.271  
Paying for dam removal under the KHSA could threaten the goal of 
dam removal by 2020 because the California PUC must approve the 
262. Id. § 4.1.1.D.
263. Under SB 76, the maximum amount of money generated from surcharges
is capped at $200 million.  See Oregon Senate Bill 76, supra note 260.  The Governor’s 
office estimated that over a ten-year period the surcharge would be a rate increase of 
1 percent for residential customers and 2 percent for an average business.  If the 
dams are not removed the money will either be refunded to the PacifiCorp customers 
or “used for their benefit.”  Id.  
264. See Preusch & Sickinger, supra note 270.
265. See Oregon Senate Bill 76, supra note 270.
266. KHSA, supra note 27, § 4.1.1.E.
267. Id. § 3.3.  The Public Utility Commission of Oregon and the California
Public Utilities Commission are independent agencies not bound by the KHSA. Id. § 
4.8.  However, the California PUC does not need any special legislative authority to 
levy such a surcharge, and is unlikely to object. 
268. See Bettina Boxall, State Legislature approves comprehensive package to overhaul
water system, including an $11-billion bond, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009 available at 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/11/state-legislature-approves-compre 
hensive-package-to-overhaul-water-system-including-an-11-billion-bo.html. 
269. See 2009 COMPREHENSIVE WATER PACKAGE: SPECIAL SESSION POLICY BILLS AND
BOND SUMMARY, http://gov.ca.gov/issue/water-supply (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). 
270. See id.
271. Id. But note that failure to approve the Water Supply Act may not be fatal
to dam removal. See supra note 247. 
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surcharge and California voters must vote for the water bond.272  It should be 
noted, however, that FERC, BOR, and private contractors estimated dam 
removal would cost between $79.9 million and $102.4 million - a fraction of 
the $450 million state cost cap called for by the KHSA.273  Even if both the 
California bond and the customer contribution fail, the KHSA parties may 
decide to proceed with dam removal, relying entirely on the $184 million 
Oregon customer contribution.  This lopsided budgeting could draw an 
outcry from residents of southern Oregon, and because Oregon has the 
power to veto the Secretary’s determination on removal,274 the parties 
should do everything in their power to secure California’s contribution.  
Even if approved, payment for dam removal under the KHSA raises 
serious questions for the taxpayer.  Because dam removal will be paid for not by 
PacifiCorp, but by the citizens of southern Oregon and northern California over 
the next ten years, the KHSA shifts the financial burden of dam removal from a 
profitable corporation to its dependent customers.275  Like the surcharge, the 
bond measure also shifts the financial burden of dam removal from PacifiCorp 
to the taxpayer.276  But the local and regional benefits of dam removal may 
justify the public expenditure.  If the KHSA succeeds, and the dams are 
removed, the citizens of southern Oregon and northern California will benefit 
from a restored wild and scenic river, rebounding salmon fisheries, and the 
fulfillment of tribal trust responsibilities.  Additionally, the KHSA promises 
removal of all four dams, which would greatly improve water quality in both 
states.277  On balance, many residents may indeed see the surcharge and bond 
measure as sound investments in the regional environment and economy.   
D. What to Do With Keno Dam
As described above,278 Keno Dam is a small, non-hydropower dam on 
the mainstem of the Klamath River, upstream from the four major dams.  In 
its application to relicense the KHP, PacifiCorp proposed to eliminate Keno 
Dam from the KHP license, claiming that FERC did not have jurisdiction 
272. See KHSA, supra note 27, § 4.8.
273. FERC FEIS, supra note 1, at 4-6, tbl. 4-4. The estimates are in 2006 dollars.
Id. G&G Associates produced a much lower estimate: $37.5 million. Id.  
274. See KHSA, supra note 27, § 8.11.1.C.; see infra Part V.B.
275. See id. § 4.1.1. Further, the surcharge requires the dams to remain in place
for at least ten years, where they will continue to block critical fish habitat. See id.   
276. See Sheila Kuehl, Water Water Everywhere For: The Bond, CALIFORNIA PROGRESS
REPORT (Jan. 18, 2010) available at http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/ 
site/?q=node/7351. 
277. See infra Part III.B.II.
278. See supra Part III.A.
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over Keno Dam because the dam has no power generation facilities.279  
Environmental and fishermen’s groups objected to PacifiCorp’s omission of 
Keno Dam from its application, describing the omission as a “ruse” to avoid 
costly upgrades to fish passage.280  The groups argued that Keno Dam blocks 
fish passage for salmonids and Pacific lamprey, alters sediment flows to 
spawning beds, raises water temperatures, concentrates nutrients from 
upriver, and provides a breeding ground for Microcystis aeruginosa.281  The 
groups claimed that PacifiCorp benefited from Keno Dam, by using the 
facility to enhance peak power production at J.C. Boyle Dam.282 
Under the proposed KBRA, PacifiCorp would transfer title to Keno Dam 
to BOR and compensate BOR for water quality issues associated with the 
dam.283  The AIP, while also calling for transfer of Keno Dam from PacifiCorp 
to the federal government, did not require PacifiCorp to compensate the 
federal government for water quality problems.284  Rather than resolve the 
fate of Keno Dam, the KHSA calls for a separate agreement on the transfer of 
the dam from PacifiCorp to the federal government by June 1, 2011.285  To 
inform negotiations on transfer, the Secretary and other parties will study 
water quality, fish passage, and future operation of Keno Dam concurrently 
with, but independent of, the studies of the four major dams.286  
The parties’ failure to agree on the terms of transfer of Keno Dam prior 
to execution of the KHSA is unfortunate for several reasons.  Most seriously, 
if PacifiCorp and the federal government fail to agree on transfer by March 
31, 2012 (the deadline for the Secretarial determination), the Secretary 
cannot proceed with dam removal and the entire KHSA will be in jeopardy.287  
279. FERC FEIS, supra note 1, § 2.2.1.  PacifiCorp claimed that because the
Keno Dam has no power generation facilities, and because it does not significantly 
benefit power generation at the four dams downstream, FERC did not have 
jurisdiction over the facility.  Id. at § 2.2.1.2. 
280. Id.  FWS and NMFS recommended upgrading fish passage at the Keno
dam, at an annualized cost estimated at $1.98 million.  Id. at tab 5-103. 
281. Fishermen’s Comments, supra note 144, § II.
282. Id.
283. PROPOSED KBRA, supra note 200, § 8.2.1.  The proposed KBRA did not
specify what type of compensation PacifiCorp would be required to pay BOR, but the 
compensation could include restoration projects to improve the water quality of 
Keno Reservoir and releases from Keno Dam into the Klamath River. 
284. AIP, supra note 25, § VII(B). PacifiCorp was not a party to the KBRA, but
was a party to the AIP. See AIP, supra note 25.  Id.  The omission of the water quality 
compensation provision from the AIP could be an indication of PacifiCorp’s 
leveraging during the AIP negotiations.  
285. KHSA, supra note 27, § 7.5.2.
286. Id. § 7.5.1; see infra part V.B. (discussing the need for further study to
inform the Secretary’s determination on dam removal). 
287. KHSA, supra note 27, § 7.5.2.
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Also, Keno Dam requires millions of dollars in environmental upgrades.288  
By not requiring PacifiCorp to compensate BOR, the KHSA leaves open the 
possibility that PacifiCorp will pass this financial burden to the federal 
taxpayer.  Because authorization for the Secretary to take title to Keno Dam 
must be included in federal legislation needed for dam removal,289 federal 
appropriations to upgrade Keno Dam could weaken congressional support 
for dam removal.  Finally, shifting environmental liability from a private dam 
owner to the federal government is bad policy and bad precedent for future 
dam removal projects. 
E. The ‘DRE’ and PacifiCorp’s Transfer of Liability
Dam removal under the KHSA revolves around a novel concept: 
Rather than requiring PacifiCorp to remove its dams, the KHSA directs 
PacifiCorp to transfer each dam to a dam removal entity (“DRE”) for 
removal.290  After PacifiCorp transfers a dam to the DRE, federal dam removal 
legislation will expressly shield PacifiCorp from any liability associated with 
dam removal, including release of hazardous substances.291  Once in 
possession of a dam, the DRE is responsible for accepting funds, securing 
permits, executing removal, and, in the event of damages during removal, 
defending liability claims.292  
As negotiated by the Bush Administration, the DRE was required to be 
a non-federal entity.293  Insisting on a non-federal DRE raised doubts over 
the parties’ ability to identify a private company willing and able to assume 
liability for such a large, unique project and execute removal within the fixed 
budget of the state cost cap.  The requirements for the DRE changed under 
the Obama Administration.  Under the KHSA, the Secretary may designate 
either the Department of the Interior or a non-federal entity as the DRE.294  
Under both scenarios, the Secretary must designate the DRE before making 
a determination on dam removal.295  If the Secretary designates a non-
federal DRE, the designation is subject to concurrence by the states.296  If the 
Secretary designates Interior as the DRE, no concurrence by the states is 
288. Alone, upgrades to fish passage will cost about $2 million.  FERC FEIS,
supra note 1, § 5.2.8. 
289. KHSA, supra note 27, app. E(K).
290. Id. § 7.4.
291. Id. app. E(L).
292. Id. § 7.1.1.  The DRE is also required to carry appropriate liability
insurance. Id. § 7.1.1(G). 
293. AIP, supra note 25, § VIII.
294. KHSA, supra note 27, § 3.3.4(E).
295. Id. see supra Part V.B.
296. KHSA, supra note 27, § 3.3.4(E).
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required.297  
Once designated, the DRE will establish a “definite plan” for paying for 
and executing dam removal.298  Upon completion of the definite plan, the 
parties will have sixty days to review the plan for consistency with the 
KHSA.299  If no party finds the definite plan inconsistent with the KHSA or if 
all objections are resolved, each party covenants not to sue any other party 
and agrees not to oppose the DRE’s attempts to secure permits for 
removal.300  Once the DRE has secured all permits and the Secretary has 
reconfirmed that dam removal will cost less than the state cost cap, the DRE 
may commence dam removal by the target date of January 1, 2020.301  
From a public policy perspective, the DRE concept is troubling.  By 
providing for transfer of the facilities to the DRE before removal, and by 
calling for legislation immunizing PacifiCorp after transfer, the KHSA frees 
PacifiCorp from all future responsibility over the four dams before the dams 
are actually removed.302  The dams will continue to block fish passage, the 
parties will not know the total cost of completing the project, and the 
environmental impacts of removal will still be uncertain, but PacifiCorp - 
which has profited off the dams for over half a century - will be immune from 
all issues related to the dams.303  It is not surprising that the Obama 
Administration included the option of designating Interior as the DRE 
because finding a suitable non-federal DRE might prove impossible based on 
liability concerns.  In all likelihood, Interior will be the dam removal entity.  
One potential advantage of the DRE approach is that PacifiCorp would 
not be responsible for securing permits for removal.304  Because the KHSA 
allows PacifiCorp to continue to sell energy generated by the Klamath 
dams,305 PacifiCorp would have an economic incentive to delay removal by 
dragging out the permitting process.306  By transferring the duty to secure 
necessary permits from PacifiCorp to the DRE, the KHSA increases the 
likelihood that dam removal will be approved in a timely manner.  
297. Id.
298. Id. § 7.2.
299. Id. § 2.1.4(C).
300. Id. § 2.1.4(C)(i–iii).
301. Id. §§ 7.2.2, 7.3.1.
302. See id. § 7.1.1.
303. See id.
304. See id. § 7.1.1.B.
305. Id. § 7.3.3.
306. See infra Part V.F. (discussing PacifiCorp’s difficulty securing permits to
remove Condit Dam).  
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F. Interim Conditions
Because removal will not take place until 2020 at the earliest,307 
mitigating environmental impacts of the Klamath dams over the next decade 
will be critical to salmon.  During the interim period,308 PacifiCorp will 
operate the KHP under annual FERC licenses309 subject to interim 
measures310 developed by PacifiCorp, FWS, and NMFS, and through Klamath 
River Total Maximum Daily Loads (“TMDLs”),311 to be released by Oregon 
DEQ and California WRCB before December 31, 2010.312  The interim 
measures require PacifiCorp to, among other things, pay $510,000 a year to 
fund salmon recovery efforts, vent turbines at Iron Gate Dam to improve 
downstream dissolved oxygen levels, fund habitat improvement projects 
within the KHP and pay $ 250,000 to fund research and pilot projects to 
improve water quality.313  The TMDLs will regulate nutrients, sedimentation, 
heat, and dissolved oxygen in the Klamath River.314  To comply with the 
TMDLs, PacifiCorp must create a TMDL Implementation Plan in conjunction 
with DEQ and California’s North Coast Regional Water Quality Control 
Board (“NCRWQCB”).315  
In addition to mandating better water quality while the parties work 
toward dam removal under the KHSA, the TMDLs strengthen the KHSA in 
another way.  As explained above,316 for FERC to grant PacifiCorp a new 
license for the dams, the states must certify that the KHP will not contribute 
307. KHSA, supra note 27,§ 7.3.1.
308. The KHP defines “interim period” as “the period between the Effective
Date and Decommissioning.”  Id. at § 1.4. 
309. Id. § 6.1.3.B.i.
310. Id. § 6.1.
311. Id. § 6.3.  See NORTH COAST WATER RESOURCE CONTROL BOARD, STAFF REPORT
FOR THE KLAMATH RIVER TMDL’S (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/ 
northcoast/water_issues/programs/tmdls/klamath_river/091223/Chapter_1_Introducti
on.pdf. [hereinafter TMDL REPORT]. Section 303(d) of the CWA requires states to 
identify “impaired” water bodies that do not meet water quality standards. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313(d)(1)(A). States must then develop total maximum daily loads of pollutants
that will result in the water body meeting water quality standards. Id. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
312. In 1997, EPA entered into a consent decree with the Pacific Coast
Federation of Fishermen’s Associations that required EPA and WRCB to complete 
TMDLs for seventeen northern California watersheds by 2007. Pacific Coast Federation of 
Fishermen’s Associations et al. v. Marcus et al., No. 95-4474 MHP (N.D. Calif. 1997). 
Plaintiffs and EPA agreed to extend the deadline to 2010. See TMDL REPORT, supra 
note 322, at 1-3.  
313. Id. app. C, D.
314. TMDL REPORT, supra note 312, tab. 1.2.
315. Id. § 6.3.2.A.
316. See infra Parts II.B, IV.B.2.
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to violations of state water quality standards.317  The Klamath TMDLs will 
include strict criteria for dissolved oxygen and heat, two problems greatly 
exacerbated by the dams.318  If the KHSA terminates and PacifiCorp seeks a 
new FERC license, the TMDLs provide Oregon and California with solid 
justification to deny water quality certification.  With this heightened threat 
of denial looming, PacifiCorp is more likely to follow through with dam 
removal under the KHSA.319  
G. Permits, Potential Litigation, and the Case of Condit
Dam
The DRE will obtain all necessary permits for dam removal, including 
federal, state, and local permits.320  Under the KHSA, permits may result in a 
termination321 of the agreement under three scenarios: 1) the DRE cannot 
secure all the necessary permits for removal; 2) a permit is issued with a 
condition that is inconsistent with the KHSA; or 3) litigation over a permit 
results in a judgment inconsistent with the KHSA.322  If efforts to remove 
Condit Dam on the White Salmon River in Washington are any indication, 
permitting issues and litigation may further jeopardize Klamath Basin dam 
removal by 2020.  
Like the Klamath dams, Condit Dam is owned by PacifiCorp and blocks 
miles of once highly productive salmon spawning habitat.323  Also like the 
Klamath dams, during relicensing for Condit Dam federal agencies imposed 
conditions and prescriptions under the FPA that made Condit Dam a net 
financial loss for PacifiCorp.324  In 1999, PacifiCorp joined fifteen 
environmental groups and five governmental agencies in a settlement 
317. 33 U.S.C. § 1341.
318. See infra Part III.A.; see also TMDL REPORT, supra note 312.  See also David
Smith, Support, concern and questions expressed at TMDL workshop, SISKIYOU DAILY NEWS 
(Jan. 29, 2010), available at http://www.siskiyoudaily.com/news/x1090828512/Support-
concern-and-questions-expressed-at-TMDL-workshop. 
319. Despite their strong legal hand, the state water boards would likely prefer
to avoid denying PacifiCorp 401 certification because PacifiCorp could respond with 
a lawsuit costing the states years of legal fees.  This reality creates an incentive for 
the states to continue to press for dam removal under the KHSA.  Another reason for 
Oregon to continue to push for dam removal is that the water provisions in the KBRA 
that promised to solve longstanding disputes require dam removal to become 
effective. See Ullman, supra note 7, at 9.  
320. Id. § 7.2.1(C).
321. Termination will occur only if a cure for the event is not reached after the
parties follow the “meet and confer” procedures.  Id. §§ 8.11.1., 8.11.3. 
322. Id. §§ 8.11.1(G), (F).
323. See Becker, supra note 12, at 813, 817.
324. See id. at 825–27. “The section 18 prescriptions in FERC’s adopted
alternative doomed Condit Dam.”  Id. at 826. 
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agreement to remove Condit Dam.325  The settlement promised that 
PacifiCorp would begin removal of the dam by 2006.326  PacifiCorp, however, 
struggled to obtain water quality certification from Washington, local 
permits from Skamania and Klickitat counties, and several federal permits 
for removal.327  In 2005, responding to the permitting difficulties, the parties 
to the settlement delayed the date for removal until 2008.328  In June 2009, 
Washington released a schedule for environmental review to inform state 
water quality certification, pushing the date for removal back to late 2010.329  
It remains to be seen if Klickitat and Skamania counties will sue the state of 
Washington over the certification, further delaying removal.330  
The struggles to remove Condit Dam demonstrate that an agreement 
on dam removal is only the first step in a complicated process requiring 
approval from local, state, and federal agencies.331  If the Condit is finally 
removed in late 2010 as currently planned, the permitting process will have 
taken eleven years from the date the parties agreed on removal.332  Notably, 
the 2020 target date for Klamath dam removal is also eleven years after the 
parties on removal,333 perhaps indicating that the parties to the KHSA took 
note of the slow pace of Condit permitting and planned accordingly.  Still, 
removing the four Klamath dams would be a much larger project than 
removing Condit Dam, and the KHSA is a much more complex agreement 
325. Condit Hydroelectric Project Settlement Agreement, Condit Hydroelectric
Project, FERC No. P-2342-011 (Oct. 21, 1999), available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/ 
idmws/nvcommon/NVViewer.asp?Doc=146919:0 [hereinafter Condit Settlement].  
326. Id. at 8.
327. See Becker, supra note 12, at 833–43.
328. Amendment of Decommissioning Application and Request for Continued
Abeyance of the Decommissioning and Licensing Proceeding, FERC No. P-2342-000 
(Feb. 5, 2005).  
329. Thomas O’Keefe, Comments Sought on Condit Dam Removal Environmental
Review, AMERICAN WHITEWATER (June 8, 2009), available at https://www.american 
whitewater.org/content/Article/view/articleid/30439/display/full/.  Like California, 
Washington law requires state agencies to evaluate the environmental impacts of 
state actions, including 401(c) certification.  State Environmental Policy Act, WASH.
REV. CODE § 43.21C (2002); see infra Part III.B.2. 
330. Kathie Durbin, U.S. Agency Holds Sway on Dam Plan, http://www.fwee.org/
news/getStory?story=1504 (last visited April 22, 2009). 
331. See generally Becker, supra note 12.  In April, 2009, Siskiyou County,
California adopted a demolition ordinance that will require the DRE to obtain a 
permit from the County before removing the three lower dams, adding another 
needed approval for removal.  Siskiyou County § 10-13.02 (2009). 
332. The parties reached their settlement in October 1999.  Condit Settlement,
supra note 336. 
333. The parties announced the AIP in November 2008 and removal is
scheduled for January 2020. DOI News Release, supra note 26; KHSA, supra note 27, § 
7.3.3. 
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than the Condit Settlement.334  In all likelihood, the time needed for 
permitting could prove directly proportional to the size of the project.  The 
historic scale of the KHSA, while exciting for restoration advocates, 
increases the chances that permitting or litigation could delay dam removal 
for years beyond the 2020 goal.  
V. Conclusion
Examination of the KHSA reveals a path to dam removal fraught with
potential setbacks.  One delay could involve the adoption of federal 
legislation,335 a process admittedly outside of the parties’ control.336  Another 
is the potential difficulty in securing funding.337  Still another is the 
controversy and high cost of the KBRA.338  Finally, parties outside of the 
agreement could stall or derail the process through litigation.339  To be sure, 
the target date for dam removal by 2020 may prove an optimistic one.  
Yet the KHSA offers the best chance of dam removal on the Klamath 
River and represents the greatest hope for Klamath salmon.340  By signing 
the KHSA, PacifiCorp has agreed to - if not entirely pay for removal - at least 
surrender its dams.341  And for the first time in the history of the Klamath 
Basin, environmentalists and farmers, ranchers and fishermen, tribes, states, 
and the federal government agree on the path ahead.342  As the parties to the 
KHSA admit, dam removal by 2020 is not a guarantee and will require more 
work and cooperation in the future.343  The KHSA is not perfect, but its flaws 
can be mitigated if Klamath stakeholders rally behind it.  It is indeed time to 
“give change a chance”344 on the Klamath. 
334. Compare Condit Settlement, supra note 336, with KHSA, supra note 27.
335. See infra Part IV.B.C.
336. See AIP, supra note 25, §VI(A)(7).
337. See infra Part IV.C.
338. See infra Part IV.A.
339. See infra Part IV.F.
340. See Charles H. Bonham, Steve Rothert, Glen Spain, Brian Barr, Curtis
Knight, Mark Rockwell and Petey Brucker, Give change a chance in the Klamath River, 
EUREKA TIMES-STANDARD (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.times-
standard.com/othervoices/ci_14245528 [hereinafter Bonham]. 
341. See infra Part IV.E.
342. See id.
343. See Bonham, et al., supra note 351.
344. Id.
